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Laboratory Training:
A Social-Experiential-Critical Analysis
(September, 1972)
Richard Kleiner B.B.A. City College of New York
M.S. City College of New York
Directed by: Dr. Donald Carew
ABSTRACT
This study was undertaken to explore laboratory training’s poten-
tial as a force for social change. To further these ends the following
were proposed: (1) laboratory training be studied in relationship to its
social context; (2) that its capabilities and limitations as a force for
social change be explored; (3) that guidelines be offered which could
increase its potential as a force for social change.
In order to accomplish these goals, literature in the field of
laboratory training was used as data for this study. The literature was
surveyed and then selected writings were analyzed in terms of a social-
experiential-critical perspective. Social in the sense that if labora-
tory training was to be seen as a force for social change then it must
be understood in terms of its relationship to current social issues and
the larger societal context. Experiential in the sense, that since lab-
oratory training makes strong use of experiential learning it could bene
fit from concepts that relate the meaning and role of experiences to the
social processes we undergo and the relevant social context within which
we live out our lives. Critical in the sense that repressed alternatives
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exist in our society which if liberated, have the potential to change
that society. Laboratory training was seen as an example of such a re-
pressed alternative that offered the possibility of becoming a viable
force for social change.
This social-experiential-critical perspective constituted the
methodology for the study. The skeleton or outline of this methodology
consisted of the following five questions extracted from Mills (1959)
The Sociological Imagination :
1. What values are really threatened in our present society?
2. By whom or by what are these values threatened?
3. What is the connection between the threat to these values and
their manifestation in terms of personal trouble and public
issues ?
4. Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to
these values, or do they define the personal troubles and public
issues they experience in terms of other values?
5. What are the levers for change?
The substantive part of the methodology consisted of the answers
to the issues raised by Mills as extracted from the writings of Laing
(1965
,
1967) and Marcuse (1964). These contemporary social critics were
chosen because their writings were seen as providing key insights into
the social issues raised by laboratory training.
This methodology was then applied to an analysis of selected
writings of Kurt Lewin (1948), and Abraham Mas low (1965). These two
social scientists were seen as key representatives of the historical
and philosophical background out of which current laboratory training
vii
practices have emerged. The methodology was then further applied to
analyze selected works of Chris Argyris (1970) and Donald Klein (1968).
These two current practitioners of laboratory training were chosen be-
cause they exemplify attempts at applying laboratory principles in work
with large social systems.
The following were some of the major conclusions and recommenda-
tions arrived at in this study:
1. If laboratory training is to be seen as a force for social
change, then its interrelatedness with the larger social system
must be analyzed and studied.
A. The dynamics of the system linkages that exist between the
technology, the collaborating socialization mechanisms,
and the individual’s action, attitude, and social role must
be studied and analyzed as they relate to laboratory train-
ing principles and values.
B. The analysis of sources of conflict existing between labora-
tory training values and our society must extend beyond an-
isolated institutional and community perspective. It should
incorporate an analysis of the relationship existing between
laboratory values and the predominant cultural values.
2. Laboratory training must clearly differentiate between legiti-
mate personal versus social sources of oppression and conflict.
From this there follows a need to develop and study guidelines
for distinguishing personal troubles from social issues.
3. Laboratory training must develop a consciousness of the sources
of social indoctrination and oppression which precondition people
and limit their freedom of mind, spirit, and choice.
vii i
4# Laboratory training must recognize and study the danger of it
being coopted to serve antithetical ends. It must analyze the
processes of protest absorption and develop guidelines as to
the appropriate and inappropriate use of its methodology in
the selection of its clients.
ix
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
Human Relations Worker: Change Agent Or Complicitor?
As a person trained in the human relations laboratory approach
to change, I have found myself constantly groping with the issue of how
my human relations skills and values can survive and prosper in a vio-
lent power-oriented world (Walton, 1965).
When I have run human relations workshops I find my values af-
firmed and my skills sharpened. But when I have left the sanctuary, I
share with fellow human relations workers and have attempted to make
changes in pluralistic situations, I have experienced a sense of futil-
ity and questioned the efficacy of my ways. In these latter situations,
human relations skills are not legitimized, collaborative-cooperative
frameworks are not the norm, and the option of a laboratory experience
is not available (Bennis
,
1969).
Slowly I began to realize the dimensions of the problem facing
human relations workers . I could no longer see laboratory education as
simply a matter of people learning a set of skills and attitudes that
they could then readily adapt to their home environment. Rather, human
relations training is actually training in a cooperative culture which
extols the virtues of collectivism and interdependent behavior. This
cooperative culture is very much in conflict with the competitive
individualistic ethos predominating in American society (Henry, 1963;
Shepard, 1970; Slater, 1970).
2The seemingly irrational power-coercive tactics such as threats
,
bluffs, and selective violence began to make sense as a logical conse-
quence of a competitive world view. In a society such as ours, we are
socialized from childhood on to see that beyond our immediate family
no one is really interested in our welfare and desires. We become con-
ditioned to and learn the behaviors that allow us to get as much as we
can from an uncaring world. "Rational self-interest" is the term econ-
omists use to legitimize such behavior (Shepard, 1965).
The outgrowth of a self-interest philosophy is that the market
place becomes the human relations arena. The skills that are valued in
this arena are the individual's ability to trade and compete with others
for the resources available in the external environment. We find our-
selves pitted against each other and soon learn that the best way to
succeed in such a system is to become a master Machiavellian where other
people become means toward one's own ends. We have institutionalized
this "exploitative" world view to such an extent that competition and
power tactics tend to validate each other. A self-fulfilling prophesy
has been achieved that is mistaken for an inherent reality in human
nature (Shepard, 19 70).
Into this self-perpetuating, exploitative system enters the iso-
lated human relations worker. He laments conditions of violence, dis-
trust, and human exploitation, and offers an alternative vision of a
cooperative world where self-actualization can occur through authentic,
caring relationships. His relative isolation, his process orientation,
and his desire to remain a democratically oriented neutralist makes
him
an easy prey for the current system. His methodology is often
coopted
3to achieve the system s ends. Human relations becomes a ploy that is
readily used by the competitive-capitalistic system to achieve a false
sense of harmony between the means of production (workers
-lab or) and
ends of production (profit) (Etzioni, 1964; Marcuse, 1964; Mills, 1959).
When the human relations worker engages in organizational devel-
opment he is attempting to make a cooperative system out of a competitive
one. How does he know if in fact he is not bringing together competitors
to engage in a larger system of competition? Does the solidarity he
seeks to achieve in organization still lead to competition and exploit
—
tion of other companies, the environment, and the consumer? Has long
range competitive advantage been gained by joining competitors in the
short run or is a new cooperative world view in the making? Further,
we must raise some questions regarding the individual's behavior in the
group
.
When group members in a training group express strong emotions,
is the human relations worker helping them become more authentic and
genuine, or is he providing the current competitive system with a safety
valve for siphoning off discontent? Does personal dissatisfaction become
viewed as solely the fault and responsibility of the individual rather
than as symptomatic of the underlying ills of a highly competitive sys-
tem? Do the larger social system pressures that might be adversely af-
fecting the individual become accountable? By posing such agonizing
questions the human relations worker may better determine whether he is
serving the interests of the status quo or if he is truly a change agent.
The human relations movement has neither acknowledged nor attended
to these issues. Instead, it has become uncritically popularized as a
4source of social change. Pfeiffer and Jones state: "In recent years
human relations training.
. . the generic term for leadership develop-
ment, encounter groups, T-groups
,
D-groups
,
awareness expansion, organ-
izational development, etc., has become increasingly visible" (1969, p. 1)
.
The thrust of this movement is to contribute to the development of humane
institutions and personal growth for normal individuals (Bennis
,
Benne,
Chin, 1969; Schein and Bennis, 1965). Carl Rogers, a leading American
psychologist, has referred to it as the "most important social invention
of this century. . . . The demand is utterly beyond belief" (1968, pp.
29-31). Yet despite its enormous popularity and growth, human relations
training has not proved that the changes produced in its workshops are
lasting and transferable to new situations.
Campbell and Dunette (1968) in a comprehensive review of forty-
four research studies argue that there is no real evidence that T-group
experience generalizes. Maliver (1971) in an article that strongly in-
dicts the group movement as a profit-making cult describes its effect:
Generally, the pattern of their group experience has been a wonder-
ful, exhilarating high that lasts for two or three days, followed by
a sudden and frightening depression. The exhilaration comes from
having felt that within the group they were intimate with and related
to other individuals . The depression occurs when the grouper real-
izes that he's back in the same old rut. (p. 40)
How is the human relations phenomena to be understood? It is
revered by some as the means of transforming society, and chastized by
others as a cult that serves the interests of profit rather than people.
This analysis is undertaken in order to shed light on the human relations
controversy and to explore its potential for social change. To further
these ends, the following proposals have been made.
51. That human relations be studied in terms of its relationship to
its social context;
2. That its capabilities and limitations as a force for social
change be explored;
3. That guidelines be offered for the human relations movement which
could increase its potential as a force for social change.
In order to accomplish this
,
a methodology with a social perspec-
tive will be developed. The rationale on the need for this methodology
will be elaborated in Chapter II, in the summary of related literature.
The methodology itself will be developed in Chapter III. The skeleton
or outline of the methodology will consist of a series of five questions
extracted from Mills (1959) The Sociological Imagination. The substan-
tive part of the methodology will be answers to the issues raised by
Mills (1959) as extracted from the writings of two contemporary social
critics, Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964). These sources were cho-
sen because their writings were seen as providing key insights into the
social issues raised by laboratory education.
In Chapter IV, the methodology developed in Chapter III will be
applied to an analysis of selected works of Kurt Lewin (1948) and Abraham
Maslow (1965) . I view these two social scientists as key representatives
of the historical and philosophical background out of which current lab-
oratory education practices have emerged.
In Chapter V, the methodology will be applied to analyze select
works of two current practitioners of laboratory education: Chris Agyris
(1970) and Donald Klein (1968). These practitioners were chosen because
they exemplify attempts at applying laboratory education principles in
work with large social systems.
6Chapter VI will be the concluding chapter. The findings from
the five previous chapters will be discussed and summarized, and the im-
plications and limitations of this study will be considered.
CHAPTER II
SUMMARY OF RELATED LITERATURE
In this chapter the laboratory training model of human relations
training will first be distinguished from other types of group approaches
often confused with it. Laboratory training will then be discussed with
special attention given to its historic commitment to social change and
social action. The development of the laboratory training model, the
assumptions behind this specialized field of human relations training,
and research pertaining to its effectiveness as a vehicle for social
change will be reviewed. The concluding section of this chapter will
support the need for the development of a methodology with a greater
"social perspective" in the field of laboratory training if it is to be
an effective force for significant social change.
Definition of Terms
Before proceeding with a detailed discussion of laboratory train-
ing, an effort will be made to distinguish it from other types of group
experiences which have become increasingly popular in recent years and
are often confused with the laboratory method. Rather than use such
earlier coined, generic terms as
1
sensitivity training or human rela
tions training," Eddy and Lubin, 19 7b and Lubin and Eddy, 1970 suggest
the need for more exacting definitions of practices in the field. With
the phenomenal growth of small group experiences, these earlier terms
are now often used in a loose and vague manner to stand for a wide
range
8of groups which are diverse in their aims and practices.
The following are some of the definitions abstracted from Eddy
and Lubin,19 71 and Lubin and Eddy , 19 70 in an attempt to distinguish
laboratory training from encounter groups, marathon groups, and group
psychotherapy
.
The laboratory training model refers to a range of experience-
based learning activities in which participants are directly involved
in goal setting, observing, feeding back their observations continuously,
analyzing ongoing data, and planning for action based on their combined
analysis. Thus "experiences" of participants within the laboratory sit-
uation itself provide the key material for learning.
The specific laboratory format itself may vary according to the
goals to be accomplished within it. An essential element in most labor-
atories is the T- group ("T" for "training"). In the standard type of
T-group, participants generally find themselves in a relatively unstruc-
tured situation, (a cultural vacuum), in which it is their responsibility
to create out of their interactions in the group a culture which can help
them meet their needs for support, feedback, and learning. The experi-
ences and behavior exhibited by the participants as they attempt to grap-
ple with this unique situation provide the data for analysis and learning.
Thus T-group participants have an opportunity to learn how their behavior
is seen by others; to become more sensitive to their feelings and the
feelings and behavior of others; to gauge their effectiveness in playing
various kinds of roles; and to develop methods for understanding individ-
ual, group, and organizational behavior dynamics.
A note of caution should be given, however. 1-groups have at
times become a synonym for "laboratory training, and vice versa. While
9it is true that the T-group usually constitutes an essential component
of laboratory training, it is not usually the only component. General-
ly* T-groups are augmented by integrating theory and skill exercise ses-
sions which are designed to help participants develop the conceptual un-
derstanding (cognitive maps) and behavioral skills needed for them to
generalize from and apply their experiences in non-laboratory situations.
Encounter groups usually refer to intensive small group experi-
ences in which the emphasis is upon personal growth through expanding
awareness, and the exploration of intrapsychic processes as well as in-
terpersonal ones. There is relatively little focus on the group as a
learning vehicle; the trainer takes a more active and direct role; intel-
lectual understanding and conceptualization of experience are devalued;
and more physical means of interaction are encouraged and utilized.
Modes of expression and sensory exploration such as dance, art, massage,
meditation, fantasy, and dream exploration are often vised as part of an
encounter group experience.
Marathon groups are generally time-extended encounter groups that
use the accumulated experience and the accompanying fatigue to break
through participants' defenses.
In summarizing distinctions among laboratory training, encounter
groups, and group psychotherapy, Lubin and Eddy state:
To recapitulate, laboratory training (including both the T-group
with a group emphasis and the T—group with a personal—interpersonal
emphasis) retains a strong tie to its origin as an educational meth
od
,
is concerned with cognitive as well as affective learning, and
values the ability of the participant to transfer learnings to the
back-home situation. It differs from gi*oup psychotherapy (the form
practiced in many adult outpatient clinics) in that lab participants
are seen as relatively well-functioning individuals, repair and res-
toration of function are not among its objectives, the leader is less
central to the process, and the perspective is upon current group de-
velopments and interpersonal transactions.
10
The T-group with a personal-interpersonal emphasis resembles some
encounter groups in some of the methods that are used, but it deals
less with personal-historical material and has more of an education-
al focus. (19 70
,
pp. 330-331)
Historical Overview of Laboratory Training
Appley and Winder (in press) offer the following rationale for
the development of laboratory training:
The laboratory movement, i.e., deliberate supervised small group
human relations workshops such as those offered at Bethel by the
organization to be called the National Training Laboratories, de-
veloped out of this grave concern of some educators and behavioral
scientists who were interested in solving what they recognized as
increasingly critical social problems, particularly in the area of
human relations: problems caused by rapid technological growth,
increased bureaucratization, and increased depersonalization. (p. 35)
Over and over again, however, it will be apparent that one important
difference between human relations and other re-educative alterna-
tives is this commitment to the idea of what "might be"— a commit-
ment to a set of values coupled with a spirit of inquiry tied to a
scientific body of knowledge, and accompanied by the personal under-
standing by the scientist/practitioner that what is very much needed
in society today is continuous planned change for organizational and
institutional effectiveness plus the opportunity for individuals to
have and maintain their integrity and exercise their influence. (p.
28)
. . . Social change was seen as an urgent necessity, and training
change agents an urgent need. (p. 29)
The beginning of laboratory training is usually traced to a work-
shop on intergroup relations held during the summer of 1946 in New Britain,
Connecticut. The workshop was an interdisciplinary, collaborative effort
whose staff consisted of several people considered to be in the vanguard
of laboratory training, e.g., Kenneth Benne , Leland Bradford, Kurt Lewin,
Ronald Lippitt (Appley and Winder, [in press]; Lubin and Eddy, [1970]).
Appley and Winder (in press) describe the significant happening
at this workshop:
In that summer of 1946, some participants in the workshop were
pre-
sent as audience when the staff of the workshop met to discuss
the
11
behavior of the same participants as observed earlier in the day.
These data had been gathered systematically on observation schedules
by the research staff. However, discrepancies as well as confirma-
tions of perceptions of the members’ behavior and the group’s inter-
actions were soon shared by both audience and staff. And it was
quickly recognized that feedback—the opportunity to give and receive
personal perceptions of commonly shared data about each other’s be-
havior and interactions—was a very exciting and powerful method for
learning, and that the impact of this kind of exchange was very great.
If changing attitudes and behaviors was an important goal at the work-
shop, here indeed was an important method. The workshop was hence-
forth qualitatively changed with the acceptance of that accidental
innovation. (pp. 25-26)
The following summer, an experiential learning activity was intentionally
designed into the workshop.
Lubin and Eddy (1970) describe the 1947 workshop:
In 1947, with the direct sponsorship of the National Education Asso-
ciation and the Research Center for Group Dynamics of M.I.T., the
above-named training staff organized a three-week summer session
at Gould Academy in Bethel, Maine. An isolated "cultural island"
location was selected because of Lewin’s conviction that change
was more likely if the usual situational forces which acted to re-
sist change could be left behind.
The Basic Skills Training Group (BST) was included in this three-
week summer session. It contained an observer who fed back behav-
ioral data for the group discussion. A staff member referred to
as the training leader assisted the group to evaluate the observa-
tions made by the observer, as well as data supplied by the parti-
cipants in the group. (19 70, p. 30 8)
The Basic Skills Training Group Session was expected to be the
vehicle through which people could gain some of the following competen-
cies: (1) change agent skills and concepts; (2) increased understand-
ing of self, group, and organizational dynamics; (3) deeper understand-
ing of democratic principles; (4) diagnostic and trainer skills (Bradford,
Gibb, Benne, 1964, pp. 85-87).
It soon became apparent that these goals could not be realisti-
cally accomplished in one three-week Basic Skills Training session. How-
ever, these earlier workshops became the catalyst for experimenting
with
12
many diverse laboratory designs in future years. Hence, the Basic Skills
Training session was modified and by 1947 would be called a T-group.
From 1949 on, Benne sees two distinct periods in T-groups labor-
atory training:
The first period, roughly from 1949 through 1955, is marked by a
variety of experimental attempts to create training formats and
technologies to serve learning objectives seen as extraneous to
those peculiarly within the province of the T-group. This led at
times to virtual segregation of T-group activities. Separate group-
ings were formed for skill practice, for application of laboratory
learnings, and for the study of change, among other activities.
Sometimes
,
separate staff units for handling T— group activities
and non-T— group activities were recruited. This experimentation
was greatly aided by two large grants from the Carnegie Corporation
of New York for the development of NTL's program.
The second period, roughly from 1956 to the present, is marked by
efforts to reintegrate T-group experiences into the designs of lab-
oratories. Experimentation with new designs and with new uses of
T-groups continues .... It is during this time that numerous
occupational laboratories developed, while the more traditional
cross-occupational laboratories continued. Regional and other lab-
oratory programs also developed under auspices other than NTL.
(Bradford, Gibb, Benne, 1964, pp. 87-88)
Bradford (1967) supports Benne’s earlier observations when he
writes
:
During the 1950’s, three trends came into being. Regional labora-
tories emerged autonomously— the Western Training Laboratory, the
Pacific Northwest Laboratory, the Intermountain Laboratory for Group
Development, and the Boston University Summer Laboratory. Some have
now merged or collaborated with NTL, as a national program has
steadily grown.
The second trend was the development of occupational laboratory
sessions held during the year—most notably in the fields of indus-
try and religion. The industrial programs now number over fifteen
each year.
Another trend, beginning in the late 1950’s, has been that NTL and
Network members have increasingly been engaged as change agents in
organizational growth and development. (p. 142)
Appley and Winder (in press) help us bridge the gap in the his-
tory of NTL from the 1950's to the 1970 's with the following account:
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In the 1960’s, recognition of these trends led to the reorganization
of NTL into five centers: (1) Center for Organizational Studies,
(2) Center for the Development of Educational Leadership; (3) Center
for Community Affairs; (4) Center for the Development of Leadership
in Government; (5) Center for International Training. These later
(1970) became: (1) Center for Organizational Studies; (2) Center
for the Development of Educational Leadership; (3) Center for Black
Studies; (4) Center for a Voluntary Society. All are now part of
the renamed NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science. (p . 38)
Appley and Winder continue:
. . . the NTL Institute does seem to have come back to affirming
clearly its historical purpose in this recent statement:
The overriding purpose of NTL Institute is constructive
societal change. Its programs focus on the development
of individual and organizational dynamics to help create
organizations that continually promote both personal and
social growth. .
. (p. 41)
Within these generalized goals of personal, group, and organiza-
tional development, Warren Bennis sees certain "meta-goals" or underly-
ing values which shape and influence laboratory training. One such goal
Bennis sees is expanded consciousness and recognition of choice. This
"meta-goal" is achieved through a process described by Bennis in
Golembiewski and Blumberg:
. . . Laboratory training, then, realizes its meta-goal of "expanded
consciousness and recognition of choice points" by way of a very com-
plicated process: extracting participants from their day-to-day pre-
occupations, cultural insulation, and aeroutinization. Parallel to
and combined with this unfreezing process is an emphasis on aware-
ness, sensitivity, and diagnosis, all of which encourage the partici-
pant to think about his behavior—most particularly to think about
how he chooses to behave. (19 70, p. 20)
Another meta—goal that Bennis refers to is a spirit of inquiry
which he describes in the following manner:
Closely related to the meta-goals of choice and, in fact, only con-
ceptually separable is an attitude of inquiry associated with science.
It is a complex of human behavior and adjustment that has been summed
up as the "spirit of inquiry" and includes many elements. The first
may be called the hypothetical spirit, the feeling for tentativeness
and caution, the respect for probable error. Another is experimen-
talism, the willingness to expose ideas to emperical testing. The
14
exigencies of the laboratory situation help to create this orienta-
tion. (Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, p. 20)
A third meta-goal of laboratory training Bennis calls "authen-
ticity in interpersonal relations:"
An important imperative in laboratory training has to do with the
relatively high valuation of feelings: their expression and their
effects. The degree to which participants can commjnicate feelings
and in turn evoke valid feelings from other members is regarded as
an important criterion of group growth. One theory postulates that
"group development involves the overcoming of obstacles to valid
communication," i.e., where valid communication is defined as inter-
personal communication free— as far as humanly possible—of distor-
tion.
Authenticity, "leveling," and "expressing feelings" comprise an im-
portant part of the laboratory argot, all of which can be summed up
in a passage from King Lear: "Speak what you feel, not what we
ought to say." (Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, p. 21)
The fourth and final meta-goal of laboratory education Bennis
refers to as "a collaborative conception of the authority relationship."
. . . most important is the realization that the teaching-learning
process of laboratory training is a prototype of the collaborative
conception of authority. Putting it differently, we can say that
learning is accomplished through the requirements of the situation
and a joint, collaborative venture between the trainer and partici-
pants. Also, there is the belief that participants can exercise
self-control in the learning process; i.e., the participant accepts
influence on the basis of his own evaluation rather than reliance on
outside controls, such as rewards and punishments. Internalization,
through credibility—rather than compliance, through exogenous con-
trols—is the type of social influence employed in laboratory train-
ing. It is precisely this form of influence which holds for the
collaborative conception of authority we have been discussing.
(Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, pp. 22-23)
The "Yogi" Versus Hie "Commisar"
The main target or client system through which these meta-goals
are to be realized has been debated in labor/rtory training. If the cli-
ent is the individual, the stress tends to be on his own "personal growth"
and interpersonal competence; to facilitate this the laboratory is
generally
15
composed of an occupationally heterogeneous grouping of strangers. If
the client is an organization, or some part of it, the stress of the
laboratory tends to be directed toward developing the capabilities of
the organization in such a way that the organization can attain and sus-
tain an optimum level of performance. The name given to a laboratory
set up for such organization development is an "organization training
laboratory' and it usually involves a grouping of individuals from the
same organization.
Since both the individual and the social system (i.e., organiza-
tion or some subsystem) have been the foci of laboratory training, staff
strategies and training designs have tended to examine either one or the
other. Schein and Bennis see this difference in approach toward labora-
tory training as analogous to the distinction between the "Yogi" and the
"Commisar" or, to be specific,
. . . between those who turn inward for insight and nirvana and those
who turn outward for social salvation. It is the difference between
those who believe in the manipulation of external forces, such as
legal, technological, economic, political factors and those who look
to the personality, self-actualization of the individual for ultimate
social improvement. (1965, p. 202)
According to Schein and Bennis ( 1965 ) , ever since the existence
of laboratory training almost all training designs and strategies have
implicitly, or explicitly, reflected this conflict. The debate which has
generated from this conflict has been useful insofar as it has raised
for examination certain crucial issues such as; (1) the problem of trans-
fer of learning from the laboratory culture to other cultures; (2) the
relationship between personal growth and organizational improvement, if
any; (3) the type of training design and laboratory strategy that shows
the most potential for utility of training effects.
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Argyris lends credence to the above first issue when he states:
A major concern in laboratory training has been to create learning
conditions that have as much transferability as possible to situa-
tions beyond the laboratory. Learning that is laboratory bounded
is of interest, but it can be dangerous because the individual could
leave, feeling that the only world that is a good one is the one in
the laboratory. Such a conclusion would hardly lead to motivation
to become interpersonally effective in the real world. (1967, p. 162)
Transfer of laboratory learning is defined by Valiquet ( 1968 ) as
"the transmissibility of what is learned in the training situation to
the customary work situation." Efforts to deal with the application of
laboratory learning to back-home problems was one of the prime content
areas in the original 1947-1948 laboratory programs, and still maintains
its position in current literature as one of the central goals of the
laboratory approach (Bradford, Gibb, and Benne
,
1964 ; Lubin and Eddy,
19 70 ; Eddy and Lubin, 19 71 ).
Kenneth Benne has noted that the problem of how to promote trans-
fer of laboratory learnings has been a particularly difficult one to
solve: lectures seem to have had little lasting effect; consultation
groups need time to get oriented and establish trust before any real
work can begin (Bradford, Gibb, and Benne, 1964 , pp. 18 , 102 ). He ob-
serves that, in the face of manifold difficulties, the medium for con-
sultation on back-home problems has fallen to the T-group. However it
seems unlikely that in transferring the function to the T-group, the
whole of the function is maintained (Bunker, 1967 ).
Edgar Schein's (Bennis , Schein, Berlew, and Steele, 1964; Schein
and Bennis, 1965 ) analysis of the laboratory training process into freez-
ing, changing, and refreezing components, based on the Lewinian (1958)
model of change, provides a framework into which the results of studies
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on the transfer of learning can be integrated. Refreezing, or the sta-
bilization and integration on changes is postulated to occur primarily
through two mechanisms: (1) integrating new responses into the person-
ality, and (2) integrating new responses into significant ongoing rela-
tionships.
Bunker (196 7) believes that the first mechanism for change postu-
lated by Schein is a legitimate one for the T-group (by itself) to foster,
but raises doubts about the ability of the T— group to facilitate the
development of the second mechanism which has to do with the application
of learning. Bunker (1967, p. 521) states:
Although the T-group is a significant factor in integrating new
responses into the personality, it is often antithetical to the
integration of new responses into the back-home situation. The
emphasis on the immediate interpersonal relationships and the
negation of outside forces preclude the discussion of back-home
prob lems .
Research findings which bear on the issue raised by Bunker (1967)
about the back-home impact of T-group training show mixed, inconclusive
results. Miles (1960, 1965), Boyd and Elliss (1962), Bunker (1965) have
reported studies of on-the-job-changes on working style and interpersonal
relations in which groups experiencing laboratory training were perceived
by co-workers as having changed significantly more than control groups.
On the other hand, Bennis (1965) uses the term "fade-out" to describe
the disturbing lack of durability of training results when participants
return to their company. Bennis (1963, p. 159) goes on to state:
What remains clear is that T-group members who increased their inter-
personal sensitivity as a result of the T-group had difficulty in
transferring their learning in settings without T-group training.
It is also clear that new tensions were generated between those in-
dividuals who attended laboratory training and those who did not.
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Harrison (1962) reports that trainees increased their use of
emotional and interpersonal descriptions of each other, but did not in-
crease such descriptions of their fellow employees back home. He con-
cludes that real changes in interpersonal perceptions can occur through
laboratory training but there is a lack of transfer of perceptions to
people not attending workshops. A study by Oshry and Harrison (1966)
was done to find out whether the inward orientation of the T-group ex-
perience turns outward and has significance for the participant's work
world. They found that although the participant becomes more sensitive
and aware of interpersonal resources, he does not see these resources
as being any more useful to him in the solution of his problems than he
did before training.
Oshry and Harrison (1967, pp. 196-197) go on to conclude:
As the manager stands on the threshold of reentry, transfer of
learning has taken place only in the sense that he now diagnoses
his interpersonal work world and his own role in it differently,
but not in the sense that he seems prepared to export the action-
model of the T-group to the solution of work problems.
A major conclusion that Bunker (1967) draws from the diverse
findings on laboratory training is that organizationally relevant learn-
ing is not necessarily the same as personally relevant learning and at
times the two may be incompatible.
The relationship between personal growth and organizational de-
velopment is a complex one that is confounded by many factors. Hobb's
(1962) in a well-reasoned argument, believes that personal insight is
not enough; at least not enough relative to the potency of direct appli-
cation planning. Bennis (1963) in referring to the writings of Alvin W.
Gouldner, challenges the theoretical notion implicit in some laboratory
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designs that individual insight alone resulting from a T-group experi-
ence can lead to more effective organization functioning.
A serious weakness that Gouldner (1961) sees in the insight ap-
proach alone is the lack of manipulability of the strategic variables.
Gouldner goes on to say that it is not obvious that insight leads to
sophistication in rearranging social systems or in making strategic or-
ganizational interventions. Gouldner believes that insight may lead to
some personal manipulation of variables but it is doubtful that it can
lead directly to external manipulation of social systems.
Bass sums up the relationship between personal growth and organ-
izational improvement as follows:
. . . the pure T-group experience may generate a great deal of in-
dividual development. The T-group may bring about increased commit-
ment to social understanding, greater self-awareness, and greater
acceptance of individuality. Yet collections of such more "mature"
individuals may make less effective organizations. (1967, p. 221)
The reasons for Bass’s pessimistic appraisal is that the destruc-
tion of the customary authority structure in the T-group in order to pro-
mote exploration and change in the individual participants, coupled with
an emphasis on the values of democracy and consensus, may cause some lab-
oratory participants to lose their confidence in using directive leader-
ship which may be needed for organizational reasons.
Argyris (196 7) believes that while values learned in laboratory
setting may be different from most organizational values, the individual
who has power and influence in his organization should be able to apply
laboratory learning. A study by Matthew Miles (1965) supports Argyris'
contention that the position a person holds within an organization af-
fects the ease with which he is able to apply laboratory training. Miles
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found that a perceived change score correlated with the security and the
power of the position a participant held in his own organization. Rather
than being entrenched and committed to the current structure and tradi-
tions of their organizations, people who had secure and powerful posi-
tions were able to feel free enough to attempt the new-lab oratory learned-
behaviors
.
The ultimate issue for change agents is the determination of
which approach to laboratory training offers the greatest potential for
utilization of laboratory learning. The answer that seems to emanate
from both theoretical approaches to planned change and empirical labor-
atory findings is that the "organizational training laboratory" shows
the greatest potential utility.
Mann (1962) states in summarizing the disappointing results from
non-organizationally oriented laboratory programs:
At best, these studies suggest that this type of training has little
or no general effect. . . . Training which does not take the train-
ee's regular social environment into account will probably have lit-
tle chance of modifying behavior. It may very well be that human
relations training— as a procedure for initiating social change—is
most successful when it is designed to remold the whole system of
role relationships ....
This point is strongly emphasized by Bennis
,
Benne
,
and Chin
(1962, pp. 617-636) in their discussion of programs and technologies of
planned change:
Isolating the individual from his organizational context, his norm-
ative structure which rewards him and represents a significant ref-
erence group, makes no sense. In fact, if it sets up countervailing
norms and expectations, it may be deleterious to both the organiza-
tion and to the individual.
Several studies have described the relative effectiveness of
organizationally oriented training laboratories in relatively closed
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and controlled systems. The following is a list of some such studies:
Argyris, 1964; Beckhard, 1966; Bennis
, 1965; Blake, Mouton, Barnes, and
Greiner, 1964; Davis, 1967; Friedlander, 1967, 1968; Morton, 1964; Winn,
1966.
Several main conclusions emerge from these studies:
1* ^ group experience is a means to an end, not an end in it-
self. There is a need for job related, problem-oriented activ-
ities if lasting organizational change is to come about.
2. The composition of a laboratory group that most closely resembles
the natural or actual work group show the greatest potential
for affecting the organization.
3. For change to occur most effectively in an organization, the
laboratory program needs to be an organic one; that is, it should
grow out of the needs identified as relevant to the organization's
purposes
.
4. Laboratory transfer of learning is greatest when values of the
laboratory are congruent with organizations.
5. Most effective organization development programs are those that
place a heavy emphasis on pre-laboratory and post-laboratory
work as well as the laboratory experience itself.
However, other studies suggest that the overall effectiveness of
organizationally oriented laboratories is still in doubt. Campbell and
Dunette (196o) in a comprehensive review of forty-four research studies
that examined the effectiveness of T-group experiences for managerial
training and development offered the following conclusions:
Examination of the research literature leads to the conclusion that
while T-group training seems to produce observable changes in behavior,
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nges f»' the performance of individuals intheir organizational roles remains to be demonstrated. (p. 73 )
To sum up, the assumption that T-group training has positive utilityfor organizations must necessarily rest on shakv ground. It hasbeen neither confirmed nor disconfirmed. The authors wish to empha-size again that utility for the organization is not necessarily thesame as utility for the individual. (p. 101)
Buchanan (1969) in a review of published studies between 1964
and May of 1968 on laboratory training in organizationally-oriented pro-
grams offers the following inconclusive summaries:
1. It facilitates personal growth and development, and thus can be
of value to the individual who participates.
2. It accomplishes changes in individuals which according to several
theories, are important in effecting change in organizations and
in effectively managing organizations.
3. One study, in which an instrumented laboratory was compared with
sensitivity training, provides some indication that more organi-
zational change resulted from the instrumented approach.
4. The finding from this literature search are compatible with the
conclusions reached in a similar review made four years ago.
(p. 477)
In that review in 1965, Buchanan had come to the following con-
clusions :
1. Laboratory training is effective as a means of facilitating
specifiable changes in individuals in the industrial setting.
2. It has been used effectively in some programs of organizational
development, but not in others.
3. Behavioral scientists associated with the National Training Lab-
oratories are actively engaged in subjecting their theories and
methods to systematic analysis, and in developing strategies for
organization development.
4. Some of these strategies, now being studied systematically, are
showing exciting results. (Buchanan, 1969, p. 466)
The results of using organizationally-oriented laboratories in
large, pluralistic systems have been basically ineffective. Bennis (1969)
states
:
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Organization development seems most appropriate under
trust, truth, love, and collaboration. But what about
of war, conflict, dissent, and violence?
conditions of
conditions
For, fundamentally, the organization development consultant tends to
use the truth-love model when it may be inappropriate and has no al-ternative model to guide his practice under conditions of distrust
violence, and conflict. Essentially, this means that in pluralistic
power situations, in situations which are not easily controlled, or-
ganization development practice may not reach its desired goals.
.
Organization development, to my knowledge, has not met with success
in diffuse power structures such as cities, large-scale national or-
ganizations, or the urban ghetto. (pp. 77-78)
Luke and Seashore seem to support Bennis 1 contention when they
state
:
. . . The simulation of large group and organizational problems in
the laboratory setting has been much more difficult than the person-
al, interpersonal, or small group level concerns. The development
of training designs that deal with the "hard-headed" concepts such
as power, influence, and conflict has been more difficult than the
development of designs which explore the "soft-headed" variables
such as love, warmth, and trust. (in Golembiewski and Blumberg,
19 70, p. 434)
Appley and Winder (in press) in describing Leland Bradford’s
hopes and concerns for the future of NTL while he was still its director
state
He saw as "good developments" the spread of experience-based methods
of learning; the rapid increase in network affiliation; the autono-
mous growth of centers and the regional organizations; and a somewhat
more controversial development, that individuals with more power and
influence were coming to NTL for training and consultation. He was
less happy that NTL has had so little collaboration or influence in
professional schools, except in schools of business' administration;
that NTL has not had much impact in the teaching of the behavioral
sciences except through its own network; and that NTL has not had
much influence on solutions to current social problems. (p . 38)
The Laboratory Culture Versus Society
Why has not human relations principles been successfully applied
in pluralistic situations—in society at large? The argument to be
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developed here is that the problems with which human relations workers
are faced are not simply limited to people learning a set of attitudes
and skills that they can then readily adapt to their home environment.
Rather, human relations training is actually training in a cooperative
micro-culture, the values of which are quite unlike those of the dominant
culture. Such a cooperative micro-culture, extolling the virtues of
trust, openness, and collaboration, prospers in an environment of abun-
dance and minimal threat; it stands in sharp contradiction to the survival-
oriented environment and economy predominating American society (Appley
and Winder, [in press]; Henry, 1963; Shepard, 1965
,
1970; Slater, 1970).
Slater (1970) in discussing the development of a new youth counter-
culture in this society states:
The old culture
,
when forced to choose
,
tends to give preference to
property rights over personal rights, technological requirements over
human needs, competition over cooperation, violence over sexuality,
concentration over distribution, the producer over the consumer,
means over ends, secrecy over openness, social forms over personal
expression, striving over gratification, Oedipal love over communal
love, and so on. The new counterculture tends to reverse all of
these priorities. (p. 100)
Shepard (1970) develops his thesis of personal growth laborator-
ies as an alternative culture:
A personal growth laboratory creates an interpersonal world which
dis confirms much of what people have learned in the world outside,
affirms the possibility of a different world outside, and provides
a partial model of what it could be like.
A personal growth laboratory is an experimental test of the notion
that mechanistic mentality and culture can be transcended. It is a
resoci alining institution, providing conditions that disconfirm some
mechanistic assumptions and affirm some different views of the self
in relation to others. (pp. 260 , 263)
What happens to these threateningly subversive values learned in
personal growth laboratories? What happens to this potentially alternative
culture that was developing in the personal growth laboratories?
Shepard (19 70) offers some clues:
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Personal growth laboratories give an experience of a better order
It does not last beyond the end of the laboratory because the lab-
oratory is a temporary little world that is insulated from the
everyday world. Experiments show what happens under controlled con-
ditions, but it is a long way from the laboratory to the marketplace
(p. 259)
Even those who can formulate the new social reality rarely achieve
any clarity about the conditions under which it might be established
in the everyday world. The alienating forces they brought with them
to the laboratory have largely disappeared, but they have been insu-
lated from the alienating forces outside the laboratory. The truths
of the laboratory culture are self-sustaining or self-fulfilling
truths
. Under laboratory conditions
,
openness breeds openness
.
When the individual returns to the interlocking systems of mechan-
istic society, he is confronted again with its self-sustaining,
se lf- fulfilling system of truth. Closedness breeds closedness.
(p. 264)
From Shepard's description, one sees that these potentially revolution-
ary values tend to remain isolated and insulated from the realities of
the larger social system. Slater (1970) offers us some insight into
this process
:
One of the basic characteristics of all successful social systems
—
indeed, perhaps all living matter as well—is that they include de-
vices that serve to keep alive alternatives that are antithetical
to their dominant emphases, as a kind of ledge against change.
These latent alternatives usually persist in some encapsulated and
imprisoned form. . .
. (pp. 110-111)
A way laboratory education can persist in an encapsulated form is as a
technology that is coopted to achieve current system goals.
Appley and Winder state:
A danger that is rarely, if ever, warned against, however, is one
the authors wish to re-emphasize; the danger is that the values which
these reeducation innovations were intended to preserve will be lost
as the technology is coopted by those who do not understand that as
Bradford et al say on the first page of their book: "a T-group is
more than a technology. . .
"
It has its roots in a system of values relative to mature,
productive, and right relationships among people. . . .
(in press, p. 40)
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An example of how laboratory training can be coopted is by down-
playing its overall value commitment and stressing its pragmatic use.
Thomas Greening shows us the way:
For example, let us briefly consider one criticism of sensitivitytraining that crops up again and again. These programs, their op-ponents charge, are naive and unilateral attempts to make people
more open, more trusting, and more sensitive to the feeling of
others, and to increase egalitarian democracy in business without
regard for the realities of business life.
Actually, this criticism is based, for the most part, on misinter-
pretation of the goals of sensitivity training. In fact, most so-
phisticated trainers now go out of their way to avoid championing
any one particular mode of behavior by the participants. It's true
that early leaders in the group dynamics field did place somewhat
excessive emphasis on democratic permissiveness as a panacea; but
few workers in this field cling to the simple belief that sensitiv-
ity training should aim solely at bringing about increased openness,
trust, harmonious human relations, and egalitarian cooperation.
Rather, the view now is that laboratory training can help to increase
the participants capacity to select more flexible and more realistic
modes of behavior on the basis of discerning assessment of their own
goals and needs and the interpersonal and task situation that con-
fronts them. (In Siroka, Siroka, and Schloss, 1971, pp. 175-176)
Another example of how human relations workers can serve current
system ends rather than work for change is quoted by Wolfe (19 70) citing
George Leonard in Education and Ecstasy
.
In the simplest kind of encounter groups, people learn to change
their modes of relating and expressing themselves in a surprisingly
short time. ... It is significant that business and industry
—
especially the aerospace industry—sponsor a large share of these
groups. Many management theorists believe that the usual efforts
to scheme, manipulate and disguise true feelings waste better than
fifty percent of the average executive’s energy and time. Then,
too, the intricate task of creating a spacecraft requires far more
trust, candor and sensitivity than did the old production line.
Corporations pursue an expanded human ability to express feelings
and relate with others, not for altruism’s sake, but for higher
profits. (p. 29)
Along with the dangers of cooptation, the field of laboratory
education must contend with the fact that highly competitive, survival-
oriented behavior is often functional (though not necessarily psychologically
27
healthy), given the realities of our larger social system. Argyris
states
:
If the situation in which the individual is placed is confirmed as
threatening, then closedness may be a functional response. Individ-
uals may become more closed for social reasons. Empirical evidence
has been presented (Argyris, 1962, 1965, 1966) that there seems to
be a general tendency for people to create social systems that are
closed and reward survival orientations. It is therefore possible
for the individual to behave in a closed manner because it makes
sense; it is functional in a closed system. (In Golembiewski and
Blumberg
,
1970
,
p. 235)
Odiome, with a touch of sarcasm, describes these encompassing
realities that the field of laboratory training has yet to "fully" con-
front .
The real flaw in sensitivity training is that it isn't consistent
with business and the economic world we live in. We are trapped in
our own standard of living. We may struggle through proofs that the
new participative styles of management are more productive than auto-
cratic styles, but then there crops up General Motors which is built
upon tight technical organization and tight discipline, being the
most successful corporation that ever existed.
Business is primarily an economic institution into which the inputs
are materials and supplies, labor, and beginning capital. Through
the process of production we obtain outputs of goods and services
and ending capital. The objective of this output is profit from
which comes growth and survival of the firm, and brings about the
end product of it all which is consumption.
Even the new Utopians are caught in this trap. They are experts at
consumption like the rest of us. I once heard of a study which
proved that people don't work for money alone. I invited the re-
searcher who had done the study to speak at a conference. I found
that he wanted $500 to make the speech and when I sadly reported
that we couldn't afford it, he wouldn't come. If you have tried
to get a good human relations trainer for your company's training
program these days
,
you know that the rates are from a minimum of
$250 a day up to $750 (for the man whose researches prove more
about the idealistic nature of man than the lower priced one.
(In Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, pp. 285-286)
A clue to what the field of laboratory training must strive for
on an increasingly larger social scale if it wishes to change the cur-
rent conditions in our culture favoring a highly competitive, survival
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orientation comes from observations on the optimal conditions for growth
and development in the T-group.
Appley and Winder state:
The first task of the trainer is to arrange the early environment in
such a way that these explorations can take place, i.e., to help
create a collaborative growth oriented learning environment through
what he does and says_ and is which is different from the everyday
competitive survival oriented environment which is the world back
home for the participants. (in press, p. 122)
Appley and Winder continue:
Given a climate of threat to self-esteem, competition, etc., a sur-
vival orientation is engaged (2) and individuals become defensive
and fall back on their traditional role related behaviors. It is
important to create an environment in which "survival" is not the
issue; an environment in which "people's general tendency toward
optimal exploration and variety.
.
.
" might be set in motion. (in
press, p. 124)
What these observations hint at is that the laboratory culture
exists as latent alternative to society's current survival orientation.
How to make the laboratory culture into a viable social alternative has
become an issue of concern for many people. Support for the position
that laboratory training must become involved with larger social system
issues in order to be an effective force for the type of social change
it advocates is found in recent literature.
Lubin and Eddy state:
. .. . the future of laboratory training will be concerned with broad-
er issues. Predictable developments can be seen in the areas of
system change, organizational development, temporary systems, social
issues, and the new university. (1970, p. 332)
Lubin and Eddy continue:
The focus of change and development has begun to shift more directly
from the individual to the social system within which he functions.
There is growing consensus that re-education and behavior change
are unlikely to endure unless the back-home environment supports and
reinforces the new behavior and encourages continuing development.
Thus, approaches that deal with changing the operations and norms of
systems are being explored. (1970 , p. 333)
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Appley and Winder state:
Still another development has to do with the new and/or renewed com-
mitment of behavioral scientists to working on social problems and
t e recognition that this means working through small groups as well
All of these developments point to the increasing need" for competent
a trainers and change facilitators
,
whose value system is firmlybased in the laboratory method. (in press, pp. 273- 274 )
With the recognition of the need for laboratory trainers to get
involved with larger social issues and systems, there is a concomitant
need for laboratory education to develop methodologies with a greater
social consciousness and perspective, in order to analyze the effective-
ness of their enlarged efforts. The next chapter is an attempt to meet
this need by offering a socially oriented methodology.
Conclusion
This chapter had as its goal an attempt to distinguish laboratory
training from other group approaches, and to trace its commitment to so-
cial change and review its overall effectiveness. An analysis of re-
search findings on the effectiveness of laboratory training in improving
small systems (e.g. individuals, small groups, simple organizations)
yields inconclusive results. The effectiveness of laboratory training
in changing large pluralistic systems—in society at large—has been
quite limited. The reasons for its minimal social change utility can
now be summarized.
If laboratory training is to be seen as a force for social
change, then it. must be understood in relation to its larger social
context. When one does this one finds that laboratory training (i.e.,
training in a cooperative culture) is taking place within a highly com-
petitive, survival-oriented culture. Secondly, society manages to
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resist and contain the laboratory movement by allowing it to exist in
an isolated and encapsulated form. In this way, laboratory training
serves the interests of the existing social order (e.g. industry, govern-
ment, etc.) and is a palliative in the form of a technology offered by
society for the dual purpose of serving its own product ends (e.g. profit,
productivity) while simultaneously hiding its pathology. Thirdly, with-
in its alternative status there exists the potential for laboratory train-
ing to effect change in the social order if it can develop a conscious-
ness and a cohesively organized form to express the oppositional yet dor-
mant values which it holds.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY: SOCIAL-EXPERIENTIAL-CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The conceptual underpinnings for this study will rely mainly on
the following three perspectives:
1. A social perspective as developed by Mills (1959) in his book,
The Sociological Imagination
;
2. An experiential perspective as employed by Laing (1965) Mystifi -
cation, Confusion, and Conflict
, (1967) The Politics of Experi -
ence
;
3. A critical perspective as developed by Marcuse (1964) in One Di-
mensional Man .
Mills tells us that people are seldom aware of the close connec-
tions between the problems they experience in their daily lives and the
structural problems of the society of which they are a part. What re-
sults is that people feel impotent and trapped by the rapidity and im-
personality of the changes around them over which they believe they can
have no control over. They experience their sufferings as private, and
feel isolated from the grieving of others.
According to Mills in the Sociological Imagination
,
Hie first fruit of this imagination and the first lessons of the
social science that embodies it—is the idea that the individual
can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only be
locating himself within his period, that he can know his own chan-
ces in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in
his circumstance. . . . We have come to* know that every individual
lives, from one generation to the next, in some society; that he
lives out of biography, and that he lives it out within some his-
torical sequence. (1959, p. 12)
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The most essential tool for applying Mills' sociological imagin-
ation rests with grasping the distinction he makes between personal
-^°-ubles and Public issues . Mills tells us that troubles occur between
the individual and his immediate range of experiences. Accordingly, the
statement of the problem and the range of solutions to his troubles lie
within the individual and immediate relations with others, and take
place within the scope of his immediate environment. A trouble is then
a private and personal matter. In contrast, issues have to do with mat-
ters that go beyond the immediate environment of the individual and his
range of experiences. Issues have to do with the organization of many
environments and the institutions that service them, and the interrela-
tionships that exist between them and the larger social system. An issue
is a public matter, a value cherished by society at large which is felt
to be threatened. An issue therefore, cannot be defined in the personal
and private terms which are applicable to the definition of troubles.
An issue often involves a problem with institutional arrangements and
with the structural contradictions or oppositional tendencies that exist
within and between them (Mills, 1959, pp . 12-15). Mills states:
In these terms consider unemployment. When, in a city of 100,000,
only one man is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and for
its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills,
and his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of fifty mil-
lion employees, fifteen million men are unemployed, that is an issue,
and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of oppor-
tunities open to any one individual. The very structure of oppor-
tunities has collapsed. Both the correct statement of the problem
and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the econ-
omic and political institutions of the society, and not merely the
personal situation and character of a scatter of individuals. (1959,
p. 15)
Mills continues:
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onsider marriage. Inside a marriage a man and a woman may experi-nce persona troubles, but when the divorce rate during the first
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Mills concludes
:
In so far as an economy is so arranged that slumps occur, the prob-lem of unemployment becomes incapable of personal solution. In so
ar as war is inherent in the nation-state system and in the unevenindustrialization of the world, the ordinary individual in his re-
stricted milieu will be powerless—with or without psychiatric aid—
to solve the troubles which system or lack of system imposes uponim*. If so far as the family as an institution turns women intodarling little slaves and men into their chief providers and un-
weaned independents, the problem of a satisfactory marriage remains
incapable of purely private solution. In so far as the overdeveloped
megalopolis and the overdeveloped automobile are built-in features
of the overdeveloped society, the issues of urban living will not
be solved by personal ingenuity and private wealth. (1959, pp. 16-17)
The task that Mills sees for the social scientist is to translate
personal troubles into public issues and public issues into terms that
are relevant to the lives of individuals. To be able to do this is to
possess what Mills calls "the sociological imagination."
Cannot the field of human relations be understood in terms of
Mills perspective? Since close to six million people have experienced
enough frustration and alienation with our society to want intensive
group experiences (Maliver, 1971) the problem translates itself from a
personal trouble of a scatter of individuals to a public indictment of
society. Hence the statement of the problem and the range of solutions
which human relations workers must be sensitive to might extend to in-
clude the type of sociological imagination that Mills advocates.
To sharpen our ability to analyze problems, Mills outlines the
following procedure:
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Ihe formulation of problems, then, should include explicit attention
o a range of public issues and of personal troubles; and they shouldopen up for inquiry the causal connections between milieux and social
structure. In our formulation of problems we must make clear the
values that are really threatened in the troubles and issues involvedwo accepts them as values, and by whom or by what they are threaten-
'
ed. Such formulations are often greatly complicated by the fact thatthe values found to be imperiled are not always those which individ-
uals and publics believe to be imperiled, or at any rate are not the
only ones. (1959, p. 145)
Mills goes on:
It is quite necessary to take these values and feelings, arguments
and fears, into our formulation of the problem, for such beliefs and
expectations, however inadequate and mistaken they may be, are the
very stuff of issues and troubles. Moreover, the answer to the prob-
lem, if any
,
is to be tested in part by its usefulness in explaining
troubles and issues as they are experienced. (1959, pp. 145-146)
And Mills concludes:
Any adequate answer to a problem, in turn, will contain a view of
the strategic points of intervention—of the "levers" by which the
structure may be maintained or changed; and an assessment of those
who are in a position to intervene but are not doing so. (1959
p. 146)
To help the laboratory trainer in further applying Mills' analy-
sis, I have delineated the components of his approach to problem formu-
lation and solution into the following questions:
1. What values are really threatened in our present society?
2. By whom or by what are these values threatened?
3. What is the connection between the threat to these values and
their manifestation in terms of personal troubles and public
issues ?
4. Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to
these values, or do they define the personal troubles and pub-
lic issues they experience in terms of other values?
5. What are the levers for change?
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Mills' analysis provides us with a framework to analyze social
issues. Marcuse (1964) and Laing (1965, 1967) were chosen to add sub-
stance to this framework. Their writings provide important insights
into the social context and issues that surround laboratory training.
Laing (1965, 1967) tells us that the nature of our experiences
must be seen in relationship to the social and political context of which
we are a part. The meaning and role of experiences are to be understood
in relationship to the social processes we undergo and the relevant so-
cial context within which we live out our lives. Since laboratory train-
ing makes strong use of experiential learning, and laboratory training is
better understood when related to its social context, it is felt that the
methodology being developed could benefit from such concepts that help us
understand the social basis of experience (Laing, 1965
,
1967).
Marcuse (1964) was chosen to be a part of this methodology because,
in "One Dimensional Man," he helps us understand that a major hope for
change in society lies in the possible but repressed alternatives which,
if allowed to emerge, would contradict the existing social order and of-
fer the potential for greater human development. Hence, what is critical
in the Marcusian sense is the notion that repressed alternatives exist in
our society which, if liberated, have the potential to change that soci-
ety. The laboratory education movement is seen as an example of such a
repressed alternative that offers the possibility of becoming a viable
force for change.
I will now attempt to answer the five questions derived from Mills
by referring to the writings of. Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964).
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lm ^}at. values are really threatened in our present society ?
Laing (196 7) and Marcuse (1964) tell us that we are estranged and
alienated from the full possibilities of our human potential. The whole-
ness of being human as marked by the ability to love, to play, to work
constructively (rather than destructively)
,
to share and relate to each
other's experience and one's own inner world (e.g. fantasy life, dreams,
body sensations) is decimated in our current society. Our society is not
using our intellectual and material resources in such a manner that it
could bring about the optimal free development and satisfaction of in-
dividual needs with a minimum of toil and misery. Such optimal develop-
ment is referred to by Marcuse as the "pacification of existence," which
he sees as the ultimate goal of a humane and free society.
Laing offers us the following illustration of the decimation of
our potential:
As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its
contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of the
existence of the inner world; we barely remember our dreams, and
make little sense of them when we do. As for our bodies, we retain
just sufficient proprioceptive sensations to coordinate our movements
and to ensure the minimal requirements for biosocial survival— to
register fatigue, signals for food, sex, defecation, sleep; beyond
that, little or nothing. Our capacity to think, except in the ser-
vice of what we are dangerously deluded in supposing is our self-
interest and in conformity with common sense, is pitifully limited;
our capacity even to see, hear, touch, taste and smell is so shrouded
in veils of mystification that an intensive discipline of unlearning
is necessary for anyone before one can begin to experience the world
afresh, with innocence, truth and love. (1967, p. 26)
In addition to our estrangement from the full range of our poten-
tial, the individual's self-determination and personal uniqueness are lim-
ited by a society which places blinders on his freedom of mind, spirit,
and choice. Rather than having authentic cultural pluralism, we have
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cultural Indoctrination where society's present values and priorities
become synonymous with individual needs and choices.
Marcuse tells us that our society replaces personal freedom of
choice and self-determination with an "administered good life" where
pseudo-individualism and pseudo-choice reign. As Marcuse observes:
The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its
effective suffocation of those needs which demand liberation— liber-
ation also from that which is tolerable and rewarding and comfort-
able while it sustains and absolves the destructive power and re-
pressive function of the affluent society. Here, the social controls
exact the overwhelming need for the production and consumption of
waste; the need for stupefying work where it is no longer a real
necessity; the need for modes of relaxation which soothe and prolong
this s tupe fi cation
; the need for maintaining such deceptive liberties
as free competition at administered prices
,
a free press which censors
itself, free choice between brands and gadgets.
Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a
powerful instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the
individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of
human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the in-
dividual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute
one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters
does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a
wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these
goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and
fear that is, if they sustain alienation. And the spontaneous re-
production of superimposed needs by the individual does not estab-
lish autonomy; it only testifies to the efficacy of the controls.
(1964, pp. 7-8)
Marcuse continues in the same vein:
The growing productivity of labor creates an increasing surplus-
product which, whether privately or centrally appropriated and dis-
tributed, allows an increased consumption—notwithstanding the in-
creased diversion of productivity. As long as this constellation
prevails, it reduces the use-value of freedom; there is no reason
to insist on self-determination if the administered life is the
comfortable and even the "good" life. This is the rational and
material ground for the unification of opposites, for one-dimension-
al political behavior. On this ground, the transcending political
forces within society are arrested, and qualitative change appears
possible only as a change from without. (1964, p. 49)
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Hence, one sees that the value that is ultimately threatened is
qualitative social change." Only in this way would a greater degree
of self-determination and maximization of human potential be possible
on a public level. Marcuse states:
. . . Technical progress, extended to a whole system of domination
and coordination, creates forms of life (and of power) which appear
to reconcile the forces opposing the system and to defeat or refute
all protest in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from
toil and domination. Contemporary society seems to be capable of
containing social change qualitative change which would establish
essentially different institutions, a new direction of the productive
process, new modes of human existence. This containment of social
change is perhaps the most singular achievement of advanced indus—
trial society; the general acceptance of the National Purpose, bipar-
tisan policy, the decline of pluralism, the collusion of Business
and Labor within the strong State testify to the integration of op-
posites which is the result as well as the prerequisite of this
achievement. (1964, xii, Introduction)
Marcuse illustrates how our society works against qualitative
social change by defining progress in terms of expanding production and
consumption, in old directions with old priorities through old institu-
tions .
Today’s fight against historical alternative finds a firm mass basis
in the underlying population, and finds its ideology in the rigid
orientation of thought and behavior to the given universe of facts.
Validated by the accomplishments of science and technology, justified
by its growing productivity, the status quo defies all transcendence.
Faced with the possibility of pacification on the grounds of its
technical and intellectual achievements, the mature industrial soci-
ety closes itself against this alternative. . .
. . . The most advanced areas of industrial society exhibit through-
out these two features: a trend toward consummation of technological
rationality, and intensive efforts to contain this trend within the
established institutions. Here is the internal contradiction of this
civilization: the irrational element in its rationality. . . .
Organization for peace is different from organization for war; the
institutions which served the struggle for existence cannot serve
the pacification of existence. Life as an end is qualitatively dif-
ferent from life as a means-. (1964, p. 17)
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In summary, the following three values are threatened in our present
society
:
A. Full possibilities of maximizing our human potential;
B. Authentic cultural pluralism and its accompanying self-determin-
ation and freedom of choice;
C. Qualitative social change which would permit the above values to
be actualized on a public scale and would establish different in-
stitutions, a new direction for the productive process, and new
modes of human existence.
2 • By whom or by what are these values threatened ?
Marcuse offers us the beginnings of an answer to this question
when he discusses our current technological system. The present system,
in his view, is characterized by the following features: it is based on
administered controls over the individual whom it molds and conditions to
fit in with its current technological needs and priorities, a technology
which dominates, mystifies, and bribes people by its (1) ever increasing
standard of living; (2) higher levels of production and consumption;
and (3) implantation of new varieties of false needs to consume and
produce that which maintains and sustains a scarcity, survival-oriented
social environment. Marcuse states:
In this society, the productive apparatus tends to become totalitar-
ian to the extent to which it determines not only the socially needed
occupations, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and as-
pirations. It thus obliterates the opposition between the private
and public existence, between individual and social needs. Technol-
ogy serves to institute new, more effective and more pleasant forms
of social control and social cohesion. (1964, p. xv, Introduction)
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Marcuse describes the conditioning process through which our cur-
rent technological rationality sustains and perpetuates itself.
The most effective and enduring form of warfare against liberation
is the implanting of material and intellectual needs that perpetuate
obsolete forms of the struggle for existence. The intensity, the
satisfaction and even the character of human needs, beyond the bio-
logical level, have always been preconditioned. Whether or not the
possibility of doing or leaving, enjoying or destroying, possessing
or rejecting something is seized as a need depends on whether or not
it can be seen as desirable and necessary for the prevailing societal
institutions and interests. In this sense, human needs are histori-
needs and, to the extent to which the society demands the repres-
sive development of the individual, his needs themselves and their
claim for satisfaction are subject to overriding critical standards.
(1964, p. 4)
Marcuse elaborates elsewhere:
. . . It is repressive precisely to the degree to which it promotes
the satisfaction of needs which require continuing the rat race of
catching up with one's peers and with planned obsolescence, enjoying
freedom from using the brain, working with and for the means of des-
truction. The obvious comforts generated by this sort of productiv-
ity, and even more, the support which it gives to a system of profit-
able domination, facilitates its importation in less advanced areas
of the world where the introduction of such a system still means
tremendous progress in technical and human terms. (1964, p. 241)
Marcuse describes the end product and predicament produced by
this process:
Thus the question once again must be faced: How can the administered
individuals—who have made their mutilation into their own liberties
and satisfactions, and thus reproduce it on an enlarged scale— liber-
ate themselves from themselves as well as from their masters? How is
it even thinkable that the vicious circle be broken? (1964, pp. 250-
251)
Laing describes how through the process of socialization we teach
children to experience and act selectively in keeping with the moral val-
ues of our current society:
We act on our experience at the behest of the others, just as we
learn how to behave in compliance with them. We are taught what
to experience and what not to experience, as we are taught what
movements to make and what sounds to emit. A child of two is al
ready a moral mover and moral talker and moral experiencer. He
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alra ady »oves the right" way, makes the "right" noises, and knowswhat he should feel and what he should not feel. His movementshave become stereometric types, enabling the specialist anthropol-
ogist to identify, through his rhythm and style, his national, evenhis regional, characteristics. As he is taught to move in specific
ways out of the whole range of possible movements, so he is taught
to experience out of the whole range of possible experience. (1967,
Laing goes on to show how, through the mechanisms of our primary
socialization agencies of the family and school system, our personal re-
lationships are molded to take on the qualities demanded by our current
society, e.g. security mindedness, status, competitiveness.
In the following example, Laing discusses Jules Henry's (1963)
analysis of how the American school system teaches win/lose competition:
In a society where competition for the basic cultural goods is a
pivot of action, people cannot be taught to love one another. It
thus becomes necessary for the school to teach children how to hate,
and without appearing to do so, for our culture cannot tolerate the
idea that babes should hate each other. How does the school accom-
plish this ambiguity?
Here is another example given by Henry:
Boris had trouble reducing 12/16 to the lowest terms, and could only
get as far as 6/8. The teacher asked him quietly if that was as far
as he could reduce it. She suggested he "think." Much heaving up
and down and waving of hands by the other children, all frantic to
correct him. Boris pretty unhappy, probably mentally paralyzed.
The teacher quiet, patient, ignores the others and concentrates with
look and voice on Boris. After a minute or two, she turns to the
class and says, "Well, who can tell Boris what the number is?" A
forest of hands appears, and the teacher calls Peggy. Peggy says
that four may be divided into the numerator and the denominator.
Henry comments
:
Boris' failure made it possible for Peggy to succeed; his misery is
the occasion for her rejoicing. This is a standard condition of the
contemporary American elementary school. To a Zuni, Hopi or Dakota
Indian, Peggy's performance would seem cruel beyond belief, for com-
petition, the wringing of success from somebody's failure is a form
of torture foreign to those' non-competitive cultures. (1967, pp
.
69-70)
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In summary, the values referred to in Question 1 are threatened
in the following way:
A. By the domination of a self-perpetuating, survival-scarcity ori-
ented technology with its concomitant means of production and
distribution
;
B. By collaborating socialization mechanisms (e.g. family, school
system, etc.) where competitive, survival-oriented skills, atti-
tudes, and roles are taught, rewarded, and eventually internal-
ized in people;
C. By alienated and brutalized people who through action, attitude,
and social role perpetuate repressive needs, repressive conscious-
ness, and repressive institutions.
3* What is the connection between the threat to these values and
their manifestation in terms of personal trouble and public issues ?
Laing identifies the source of the pervasive personal troubles of
our age as the estrangement of our selves from our own inner states and
feelings and from each other’s. Laing calls this "alienation" and des-
cribes some of its manifestations:
. . .disturbed and disturbing patterns of communications reflect the
disarray of personal worlds of experience whose repression, denial,
splitting, introjection
,
projection, etc.—whose general desecration
and profanation—our civilization is based upon.
When our personal worlds are rediscovered and allowed to reconsti-
tute themselves, we first discover a shambles. Bodies half-dead;
genitals dissociated from heart; heart severed from head; head dis-
sociated from genitals. Without inner unity, with just enough sense
of continuity to clutch at identity—the current idolatry. Torn
—
body, mind and spirit—by inner contradictions, pulled in different
directions. Man cut off from his own mind, cut off equally from his
own body— a half-crazed creature in a mad world. (1967, p. 55)
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The others have become installed in our hearts, and we call them
ourselves. Each person, not being himself either to himself orthe other, just as the other is not himself to himself or to us inbeing another for another neither recognizes himself in the other
nor the other in himself. Hence, being at least a double absence!haunted by the ghost of his own murdered self, no wonder modern manis addicted to other persons, and the more addicted, the less satis-fied, the more lonely. (1967, p. 74)
The translation of this sense of personal alienation into the
public and social issues that it relates to is often short-circuited so
that the problem and solutions to alienation remain defined in personal
terms. This occurs because the single situation or particular case rather
than the social system issues which they are related to often becomes the
object of treatment.
Marcuse uses the field of human relations to show how personal
troubles can become isolated from the social system issues which helped
cause the problem.
I shall take as an example a "classic" of industrial sociology: the
study of labor relations in the Hawthorne Works of the Western Elec-
tric Company. 1 It is an old study, undertaken about a quarter of a
century ago, and methods have since been much refined. But in my
opinion, their substance and function have remained the same. More-
over, this mode of thought has since not only spread into other
branches of social science and into philosophy, but it has also
helped to shape the human subjects with whom it is concerned. The
operational concepts terminate in methods of improved social con-
trol; they become part of the science of management. Department of
Human Relations.
• Marcuse gives the following example:
. . . a worker B makes the general statement that the piece rates
on his job are too low. The interview reveals that "his wife is in
the hospital and that he is worried about the doctor's bills he has
incurred. In this case, the latent content of the complaint con-
sists of the fact that B's present earnings, due to his wife's ill-
ness, are insufficient to meet his current financial obligations."
^The quotations are from Roethlisberger and Dickinson, Manage-
ment and the Worker. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947).
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Such translation changes significantly the meaning of the actualproposition. The untranslated statement formulates a general con-dition in its generality ("wages are too low"). It goes beyond theparticular condition in the particular factor and beyond the worker’sparticular situation. In this generality, and only in this general-ity, the statement expresses a sweeping indictment which takes theparticular case as a manifestation of a universal state of affairs
and insinuates that the latter might not be changed by the improve-
ment of the former.
Thus the untranslated statement established a concrete relation be-
tween the particular case and the whole of which it is a case— and
this whole includes the conditions outside the respective job, out-
side the respective plant, outside the respective personal situation.
This whole is eliminated by the translation, and it is this operation
which makes the cure possible. (1964, pp . 109-110)
Marcuse goes on:
. . . In this context, functionalization has a truly therapeutic ef-
fect. Once the personal discontent is isolated from the general un-
happiness, once the universal concepts which militate against func-
tionalization are dissolved into particular referents, the case be-
comes a treatable and tractable incident. To be sure, the case re-
mains incident of a universal—no mode of thought can dispense with
universals—but of a genus very different from that meant in the un-
translated statement. The worker B, once his medical bills have
been taken care of, will recognize that, generally speaking, wages
are not too low, and that they were a hardship only in his individual
situation (which may be similar to other individual situations). His
case has been subsumed under another genus— that of personal hardship
cases. He is no longer a "worker" or "employee" (member of a class),
but the worker or employee B in the Hawthorne plant of the Western
Electric Company.
In conclusion, the threat to the values referred to in Question
1 manifests itself in terms of a prevailing sense of personal alienation
and estrangement. The translation of this sense of personal alienation
and estrangement into the related and appropriate public and social
issues is often short-circuited so that the problem and solution to
alienation remains defined in personal terms (i.e., personal troubles).
This occurs because the single situation or particular case rather than
the social system in which it is grounded, often becomes the object of
treatment. The end result is that the personal trouble becomes isolated
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and treated apart from the pathology of the social system; the latter
is thus insulated from critical study.
4
*
-~
e Pe°P le generally aware and concerned about the threat to
.these values, or do they define the personal troubles and pub-
lic issues they experience in terms of other values ?
Laing and Marcuse both tell us that people are not generally
aware and concerned about the threat to the values described in Question
1 . Laing states
:
Human beings seem to have an almost unlimited capacity to deceive
themselves, and to deceive themselves into taking their own lies for
truth. By such mystification, we achieve and sustain our adjustment
adaptation, socialization. But the result of such adjustment to our
society is that, having been tricked and having tricked ourselves
out of our minds, that is to say, out of our own personal worlds of
experience, out of that unique meaning with which potentially we may
endow the external world, simultaneously we have been conned into
the illusion that we are separate "skin-encapsuled egos." Having at
one and the same time lost our selves and developed the illusion
that we are autonomous egos, we are expected to comply by inner con-
sent with external constraints, to an almost unbelievable extent.
(1967, pp. 72-73)
The process through which we maintain a false consciousness and
sustain our adjustment to our current social system Laing calls "mystifi
cation," the prime function of which is to maintain the status quo.
Laing describes how mystification works:
To mystify, in the active sense, is to befuddle, cloud, obscure,
mask whatever is going on, whether this be experience, action, in
process, or whatever is "the issue." It induces confusion in the
sense that there is failure to see what is "really" being experi-
enced, or being done, or going on, and failure to distinguish or
discriminate the actual issues. This entails the substitution of
false for true constructions of what is being experienced, being
done (praxis)
,
or going on (process)
,
and the substitution of false
issues for the actual issues. (1965, p. 344)
Laing continues:
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If we detect mystification, we are alerted to the presence of a con-flict of some kind that is being evaded. The mystified person, in
n- ^
mystified, is unable to see the authentic con-flict, but may or may not experience intra- or interpersonal conflictof an inauthentic kind. He may experience false peace, false calm
or mautnentic conflict and confusion over false issues. (1965
p. 345)
Laing relates how mystification works on a social level:
Marx used the concept of mystification to mean a plausible misrepre-
sentation of what is going on (process) or what is being done (prax-is) in the service of the interests of one socioeconomic class (the
exploiters) over or against another class (the exploited). By repre-
senting forms of exploitation as forms of benevolence, the exploit-
ers bemuse the exploited into feeling at one with their exploiters,
or into feeling gratitude for what (unrealized by them) in their ex-
ploitation
,
and, not least, into feeling bad or mad even to think of
rebellion. (1965, p. 343)
The values that the majority of people define their personal
troubles and social issues over are the normative standards and needs
propagated by advanced industrial society.
Marcuse states:
If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television program and
visit the same resort places, if the typist is as attractively made
up as the daughter of her employer, if the Negro owns a Cadillac,
if they all read the same newspaper, then this assimilation indi-
cates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which the
needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Estab-
lishment are shared by the underlying population. (1967, p. 8)
Marcuse continues
:
We are again confronted with one of the most vexing aspects of ad-
vanced industrial civilization: the rational character of its ir-
rationality. Its productivity and efficiency, its capacity to in-
crease and spread comforts, to turn waste into need, and destruc-
tion into construction, the extent to which this civilization trans-
forms the object world into an extension of man’s mind and body
makes the very notion of alienation questionable. The people recog-
nize themselves in their commodities ; they find their soul in their
automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The
very mechanism which ties the individual* to his society has changed,
and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has pro-
duced. (1964, p. 9)
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In conclusion, people are generally unaware of the threat to the
values described in Question 1. The values that the majority of people
define their personal troubles and public issues over are the normative
standards and needs propagated by advanced industrial society. Hence,
when the social context is studied, social issues often become defined
in terms of quantitative adjustments rather than qualitative changes,
since the criteria for judging the given system are often the norms of
that system. This makes for a "locked" analysis since the range of
judgments is limited within the norms of that system and exclude critical
concepts that challenge their validity.
The methodology developed in this chapter can now be summarized.
The framework for this methodology will revolve around the following
five questions extracted from Mills' (1959) The Sociological Imagination .
1. What values are really threatened in our present society?
2. By whom or by what are these values threatened?
3. What is the connection between the threat to these values and
their manifestation in terms of personal troubles and public
issues ?
4. Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to
these values, or do they define the personal troubles and public
issues they experience in terms of other values?
5. What are the levers for change?
The following answers to these questions as summarized from the
writings of Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) will provide the sub-
stantive base for the methodolpgy
.
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These questions and answers will then be used in the next two
chapters as a frame of reference to analyze selected works in the field
of laboratory training.
1 : Hhat values are really threatened in our present society ?
A. Full possibilities of maximizing our human potential;
B. Authentic cultural pluralism and its accompanying self-
determination and freedom of choice;
C. Qualitative social change which would permit the above val-
ues to be actualized on a public scale and would establish
essentially different institutions, a new direction for the
productive process, and new modes of human existence.
Question 2 ; By whom or by what are these values threatened ?
A. By the domination of a self-perpetuating, survival—scarcity
oriented technology, with its concomitant means of produc-
tion and distribution.
B. By collaborating socialization mechanisms (e.g. family,
school system, etc.) where competitive, survival-oriented
skills, attitudes, and roles are taught, rewarded, and even-
tually internalized in people.
C. By alienated and brutalized people who through action, atti-
tude, and social role perpetuate repressive needs, repressive
consciousness, and repressive institutions.
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£u_estion 3 : Wha^is the connection between the threat to these val-
ues and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles
and public, issues ?
The threat to these values referred to in Question 1 manifests
itself in terms of a prevailing sense of personal alienation and estrange-
ment. The translation of this sense of personal alienation into the re-
lated and appropriate public and social issues is often short-circuited
so that the problem and solution to alienation remains defined in person-
al terms (i.e., personal troubles). This occurs because the single situ-
ation or particular case, rather than the social system in which it is
grounded, often becomes the object of treatment. The end result is that
the personal trouble becomes isolated and treated apart from the patholo-
gy of the social system; the latter is thus insulated from critical study.
Question 4 : Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat
to these values or do they define the personal troubles
and public issues they experience in terms of other values ?
People are generally unaware of the threat to the values described
in Question 1. The values that the majority of people define their per-
sonal troubles and public issues over are the normative standards and
needs propagated by advanced industrial society. Hence, when the social
context is studied, social issues often become defined in terms of quan-
titative adjustments rather than qualitative changes, since the criteria
for judging the given system are often the norms of that system. This
makes for a "locked" analysis since the rang£ of judgments is limited
within the norms of that system and excludes critical concepts that chal-
lenge their validity.
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areas
(1964)
estion 5: What are the levers for change ?
The levers for change will be broken down and summarized in two
as they relate to the values that Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse
see as threatened in our society,
A. Levers to increase peoples’ ability to maximize their human
potential
:
1* There is a need for a critical frame of reference which
judges human behavior in terms of human potential rather
than our currently operative normative standards (Marcuse,
1964, pp. 214-215).
2. In our efforts to develop our human potential, it is not
enough to analyze the immediate experiential concrete-
ness of a situation and the behaviors to be maximized
within it. We must also study the factors which make up
the larger social context and the behavior of people in
it and how the desired changes can be supported and sus-
tained (Laing, 1967, p. 48).
3. There is a need to make a personal value judgment as to
how alienated and estranged we are from our own poten-
tial, and the degree to which others suffer from this
alienation. We must assess our willingness to change
this condition (Laing, 1967, Introduction).
4. In order to achieve the above, there must be a demystifi-
cation of experience through the following: (a) aware-
ness of authentic personal and social sources of oppres-
sion and conflict (Laing, 1965, pp. 343-345); (b) the
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validation of experiences through human contact and com-
munal sharing (Laing, 1967, pp. 56, 77).
B. Levers leading to a greater freedom of mind, spirit, choice,
and qualitative social change:
1. We must refuse to accept the prevailing ideology of so-
ciety as an inherent reality. Rather, we must develop
a transcending analysis and consciousness which compares
current practices of society with other possible alterna-
tives and evaluates them in terms of their potential to
contribute to optimal human development (Marcuse, 1964,
Introduction)
.
2. We must intensify our consciousness of social indoctrina-
tion and oppression, sharpen our awareness of how we are
preconditioned to want to (a) produce, (b) consume,
(c) compete, (d) possess, etc. in accordance with the
current technological and economic needs of our social
system (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 4-11).
3. We must assess the extent of vulnerability to cooptation
of oppositional and transcending alternatives through
their wholesale incorporation into the established order.
The ideal becomes prostituted through the depletion of
its oppositional and substantive values while its form
(i.e., technology) is reproduced and displayed on a mas-
sive scale. In this way the rationality of a critical
protest against the established order is absorbed, and
the potentially transcending alternative ends up support-
ing the existing social order (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 57-61).
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4. In order to gain a critical perspective on our society,
we must adopt a sense of and detachment from its current
values and operation. Empathy and identification must
be replaced by estrangement and dissociation. Through
this process the current social order can then be criti-
cally judged as one possible historical practice among
many (Marcuse, 1964, p. 67).
5. We need to avoid the tendency to identify the truth val-
ue of an experiential reality with the possibility of it
constituting a social reality (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 170-
180)
.
6. In analyzing problems critically for their social rele-
vance, we need to look at their generalizing potential.
In its generalizability, a particular problem can become
a manifestation of a large social system issue. The more
a particular problem (e.g., particular situation, case)
lends itself to being generalizable
,
the more correct it
is to translate it from the realm of a personal trouble
into a public issue. If a problem is truly unique and
idiosyncratic, it is correct to formulate it as a person-
al trouble (Marcuse, 1964, pp . 108-114).
7. We must learn to employ a dialectical approach which
helps us see the contradiction and tension existing be-
tween "what is" and "what ought to be." This approach
assumes that the current social reality is not an inher-
ent-objective reality but one established historical
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practice (i.e., established universe of facts, ideas,
values) which must be judged against other possible al-
temative practices (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 141-142).
8. We must analyze the irrationality and contradictions of
established society, and determine the alternative ten-
dencies and practices within the society which, if allowed
to emerge, could lead to more optimal human development
(Marcuse, 1964, p. 227).
Conclusion
In the following two chapters, the questions and answers that
constitute the basis of this methodology will be used as a frame of ref-
erence to analyze selected works in the field of laboratory training.
In Chapter IV, the methodology developed in this chapter will be
applied to an analysis of Kurt Lewin's, "Resolving Social Conflicts"
(1948) and Abraham Mas low’s, "Eupsychian Management" (1965). These two
works were chosen because they appeared to be representative of the so-
cial, historical, and philosophical background out of which current lab-
oratory education practices have emerged.
In Chapter V, the methodology will be applied to analyze Donald
Klein's (1968) "Community Dynamics and Mental Health" and Chris Argyris’
Intervention Theory and Method" (1970). The selected works of these
two laboratory educators were chosen because they exemplify attempts at
applying laboratory education principles in work with large social sys-
tems .
CHAPTER IV
A REPRESENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL
AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LABORATORY TRAINING
Social-Experiential-Critical Analysis As
Applied To Selected Writings Of Lewin And Maslow
Question 1; What values are really threatened in our present society ?
Lewin answers this question mainly in terms of his concern for
the values of democracy, based on tolerance of differences, equality of
rights and opportunity, freedom of choice for individuals, and cultural
pluralism for groups . He would place emphasis on human values as opposed
to superhuman values, such as the state, science, etc., and he would
stress education for independence rather than blind obedience.
In order to obtain and sustain a democracy, Lewin sees the need
for practical everyday experiences with democracy and continual develop-
ment and refinement of democratic leadership, fellowship, and democratic
values. For Lewin, democracy must be learned anew by each new generation
since it is a far harder structure to sustain than an autocracy where the
initiative and responsibility rests with the leader (Lewin, 1948, pp. 36,
52, 77, 122).
In contrast, Maslow answers this question in terms of people be-
coming self-actualizing and maximizing their human potential. Maslow
coined the term "Eupsychia" to mean movement towards psychological health
(i.e., self-actualization). It is concerned with the actions taken by
people to foster such a condition and the mental and social conditions
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needed to sustain it. In short, it stands for the ideal but possible
heights that human development can reach (1965, Preface).
Maslow delineates the needs that must be met before Eupsychian
conditions could prevail. They include satisfaction of basic safety
and security needs, belonging needs, love needs, respect needs, and
self-esteem needs (1965, p. 15).
In comparing the combined answers of Lewin (1948) and Maslow
with Marcuse and Laing (1965, 1967), there seems to be a strong similar-
ity in terms of their valuing cultural pluralism and its accompanying
self-determination and freedom of choice, and the need for people to max-
imize their human potential. The crucial difference lies in their anal-
ysis of the capacity and willingness of American society to permit the
above values to be actualized on a public scale. Both Lewin and Maslow,
though acknowledging the need for quantitative adjustments in our system,
see the conditions of American society as basically favoring the develop-
ment of the values they are advocating. There is no inherent conflict
for Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) as there is for Laing (1965, 1967)
and Marcuse (1964) between the values they are espousing and the way
American society is organized.
Lewin states:
. . . the American happens to live in a country where the efficiency
of the process of group decisions is relatively highly developed, at
least in small groups, and where democratic leadership is thoroughly
accepted as a cultural pattern and taught in practice to children in
school. (1948, p. 37)
Lewin had a strong faith in the American brand of democracy and
felt that Americans so deeply understood the principles of democracy that
they would be the natural ones to teach the practical application of de-
mocracy to Germany after World War II.
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Lewin states:
ihi?h h
C
°T1VeS k ! taSk ° f democratUing realistically as a processw c as to reach deep into family action and everyday group life U
rchToi ° H
S °mef at h°Peless attempt such a change mainly throughs o ls. undreds of thousands of American teachers would have to ben over. These Americans, even hyphenated Americans and certainlyrefugees, are likely to create nothing but resentment in such a posi-
es ' i
Se£mS feaslble an<* natural to build up group work aroundthe feeding of Europe after this war in such a way that the coopera-tive work for reconstruction would offer a real experience in demo-
cratic group life. It would be possible to reach a large number and
ob a§e levnls in this and other works of reconstruction.
( 1948
,
p. 41 )
It is hard to fault Lewin's faith in American democracy when one
realizes that he was a German Jew who was exposed to the horrors and bru-
tality of the Nazi era in Germany. His frame of reference was such that
America was truly a positive alternative to Germany.
Lewin s faith and identification with American society led him to
believe that a natural extension of work for an action-oriented social
scientist was to help American industry become more productive and effi-
cient. In order to achieve this goal, Lewin recognized the importance
of attending to the informal grouping of people, the "human relations
factor" which often established unofficial work norms that management
often ignored.
In discussing the successful work in industry of colleague Alex
Borelas
,
Lewin describes the factors human relations workers must deal
with
:
It seems that the basic principles which guided the action of the
psychologist might be summed up as follows: The realistic demands
of production have to be satisfied in a way which conforms with the
nature of group dynamics.
To bring about a permanent solution it does not suffice to create
amicable relations. The conflict described arose out of an aspect
57
of production where overlapping authorities existed in a cognitivelyunclear situation. The procedure is guided to an equal degree bythe consideration of production and the problem of social relations.
As to details, one might mention the following points. The factorywork can be seen as a process in which the speed is determined by
'
certain driving and restraining forces. The production process runsthrough certain channels as determined by the physical and social
settings, particularly by certain "rules” and by the authorities inpower (management). To increase production one can try to increasethe driving forces by higher incentives or pressure, or try to weak-
en these forces that keep production down. The procedure describedhere follows the latter possibility. It tries to eliminate certain
conflicts within the group and certain psychological forces acting
on a key individual (the mechanical) which deter his efforts. (Lewin
1948, p. 138)
Hence, Lewin accepted the prevailing American definition of pro-
gress in terms of expanding production and consumption. His prime con-
cern was the development of "means" for humanizing the technology so
that it might better coincide with the above definition of progress.
Lewin did not seem to question the direction and end products of tech-
nology. He did not see a strong need for the establishment of different
institutions or new directions for the productive process. This was
probably due to his belief that a basic harmony of interest exists be-
tween the good society (American democracy) and the needs of its citizens.
Lewin's analysis contrasts with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse
(1964) who saw a basic conflict of interests existing between American
society and its citizens. For Laing and Marcuse the vested interests of
our society are organized around the principles of pseudo-scarcity and
competition which creates a destructive form of the struggle for existence
within and between individuals. The end result of this contrast of anal-
yses was that Lewin's prime commitment was not to "qualitative social
change," as defined by Laing and Marcuse but rather to the improvements
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and adjustments that would make a basically good American society an
even better one.
Mas low too, tends to identify with American society and sees a
basic harmony of interests between the way American society is organized
and the psychological needs of people. He sees American society as fos-
tering the conditions necessary for Eupsychian principles to work.
Mas low states:
Another thing that has to be said very clearly and made far more
conscious than it now is in the management literature is that Drucker
and the other theorists are assuming good conditions and good luck,
good fortune. It is perfectly true that these assumptions are valid
in the United States at this time. It is just as true that they are
probably not valid or at least not as valid in other countries and
would not be valid in the United States if there were some kind of
atomic catastrophe, for instance. (1965, p. 36)
Certainly I would not assume it under such circumstances, even though
I do assume all of these things under present circumstances
. The
higher life and the higher kind of human being which Drucker has been
assuming certainly does exist now. Historically, the American citi-
zen is a relatively high type—especially American women who are far
more advanced than the women of most of the rest of the world. But
this higher life rests upon the prior gratification of the basic
needs, e.g., safety needs which are now satisfied, belongingness
needs which are now satisfied and so on. But supposing that these
basic need gratifications were removed or threatened or put into
short supply. Then the high superstructure of health psychology
(eupsy chology ) would collapse. (1965, p. 37)
From Maslow’s analysis, one sees no mention of how the technolog-
ical base of our society is organized around perpetuating a false sense
of deprivation of basic needs thereby fostering conditions which tend to
fixate people at lower levels of need gratification. By preconditioning
people to want to produce, and consume, and by having planned obsoles-
cence as a basic feature of our economy, conditions are created which
help to perpetuate a pseudo-scarcity survival orientation which works
against the attainment of higher levels of human development required
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for Mas low’s Eupsychian management principles to prosper.
Although Mas low’s analysis does not elucidate the threat and
conflict existing between the way the technological base of American
society is organized and the attainment of human potential values, he
does point to a vision of qualitative change in the concept of synergy.
Mas low states:
Ruth Benedict has defined synergy as the social-institutional arrange-
ments which fuse selfishness and unselfishness, by transcending their
oppositeness and polarity so that the dichotomy between selfishness
and altruism is resolved and transcended and formed into a new high-
er unity. This is to be done by institutional arrangements so that
when I pursue my selfish gratifications I automatically help others,
and when I try to be altruistic, I automatically reward and gratify
myself. (1965
,
p. 103)
For Maslow, synergy was the social-institutional equivalent of
psychological health (i.e., self-actualization) within the individual
and was the ultimate goal of a healthy society (1965, p. 88).
Question 2 : By whom or what are these values threatened ?
Lewin (1948) tells us that democracy and freedom are related to
and interwoven with every other aspect of the culture e.g., child rear-
ing practices, how schools are run, how the process of education is con-
ducted. Hence, democracy is fostered or threatened by experiences that
people have daily in their life in groups. Democracy requires continual
cultivation and renewal in terms of training people to be democratic
leaders and followers; development of democratic structures and processes
where voluntary and responsible participation is rewarded and democratic
values internalized. Where these conditions, do not prevail in the gener-
al cultural settings in which individuals and groups live, democracy
falters. Democracy is also threatened by conditions in the general
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culture which support intolerance, an emphasis on superhuman (e.g.,
State, science) as opposed to human values, and education which trains
people to be obedient rather than independent.
Mas low delineates the following conditions as threatening the
emergence of Eupsychian management: (1) scarcity of goods; (2) cessa-
tion of or threats to basic need gratification; (3) antisynergic laws
and institutions; (4) bad communications; (5) dishonesty and the vul-
garization of the truth (1965, p. 42).
Maslow stresses how conditions of scarcity create survival ori-
ented behavior which works against the development of synergic systems.
Now another point that I want to deal with at length is the fact
that synergy, mutual interdependence, mutual advantage, the "what's-
good-for-me-is-good-for-you" kind of philosophy, is all very truem the long run under good conditions. It is definitely not truem the short run, in emergencies, under bad conditions, especially
under conditions of scarcity. When there is a need for ten lamb
chops and only one lamb chop exists
,
then in fact my interest is
antagonistic to your interests. Whoever gets the lamb chop is hurt-
ing the other people. What is good for me is bad for you under such
circumstances. We must be very aware of this.
.
. (1965, pp. 115-116)
Another threat to self-actualization and the creation of synergic
systems is the tendency towards an "atomistic" conceptualization of the
world, or the tendency to perceive things as existing exclusively, with
no mutuality, no interrelationship, no higher unity (1965, pp. 108, 112).
For Maslow, the overriding issue as to whether we will have self-
actualizing individuals and synergic institutions is the health of the
society in which we live.
More should be said on the relation between the enterprise and the
society, especially if we take into account the ways to keep the or-
ganization healthy over a period of a hundred years. It then becomes
most obvious about the mutual ties between the enterprise and the
society— for one thing the healthy organization will need a steady
supply of fairly well-matured and well-educated personalities (it
cannot use delinquents, criminals, cynical kids, spoiled and indulged
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kids, hostile people, warmongers, destroyers Mn H a io *- ,
exactly these people are the products o7a7o“eLf '
k
very much like saying that a poor society cannot support 'heaHhy
18
enterprises, m the long run at least.
It is also true that the healthy enterprise cannot function at allwell under conditions of riots and civil war, of epidemics of sibot age and murder, of class warfare, or caste warfare. The cultureitself has to be healthy for this reason as well. (Maflow! W65
As mentioned previously, Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) do not
stress, as Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) do, how the values dis-
cussed in Question 1 are threatened by the maintenance of a self-perpet-
uating survival-scarcity oriented technology. Nor do Lewin and Maslow
discuss how socialization mechanisms such as the family and school system
collaborate in fostering a survival-scarcity oriented life approach. Nor
is there a discussion of the logic and functionality (though not neces-
sarily health) of people acting in highly competitive, closed, and dis-
trustful ways, given the accumulative effects of the values of our cur-
rent technology and primary socialization mechanisms operating on people.
Question 3 : What is the connection between the threat to these values
and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles and
public issues ?
Lewin (1948) tells us that when the values of democracy and free-
dom of choice are threatened they manifest themselves in terms of the
following personal troubles: (1) increased tension; (2) intolerance;
(3) hostile domination; (4) hostile criticism; (5) personalized-self-
centered attitudes; (6) submissiveness and blind obedience to authority;
(7) restlessness; (8) personal aggression.
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Lewin sees the following public issues manifesting themselves as
a result of the threat to the values of democracy and freedom of choice:
(1) economic and social discrimination; (2) barriers of caste and group
prejudice; (3) minority self-hatred; (4) fascism; (5) war versus
peace; (6) emphasis on superhuman values versus human values.
One further point should be made in terms of Lewin’s (1948) an-
swer to Question 3: He did not really deal with "alienation" and "es-
trangement as a manifestation of the problem of contemporary life.
Lewin (1948) seemed to be concerned with the problems of humanizing a
developing industrial society (e.g., increasing productivity, economic
and social barriers against sharing the wealth of the nation).
Laing (1965
,
1967) and Marcuse (1964) seem more concerned about
the problems of an advanced or post-industrial era where the central
issues move away from the questions of struggle and survival to the
"quality of life." Where problems become defined less in terms of "cre-
ating the pie" and sharing it (i.e., my piece of the pie) and more in
terms of "how does the pie taste?" Hence, the concern with the "problem
of alienation" might be considered a public luxury of a post-industrial
society, in contrast to less developed societies, where people do not
have the time and energy to devote to the higher issues of life.
Maslow (1965) tells us that "if" social conditions are unfavor-
able for the meeting of higher human needs (Maslow sees condition as
favorable in uhe United States), people will tend to become fixated at
lower levels, such as at safety needs. The result would be that people
would tend to be perpetually afraid (e.g., fear unemployment, loss of
income) and see themselves in a survival contest with others for the
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scarce resources available. They would then tend to act in a highly
suspicious and competitive way towards each other for they would see
their interests as being mutually exclusive rather than compatible with
each other.
Maslow elucidates the issues:
To be more specific, what I am feeling is that these new Theory Yeupsy chian management policies are in fact very fine in today’sUnited States, with citizens who are fairly healthy, sophisticated
and autonomous, under cultural circumstances of a particular kind
’
ln a democracy, etc. But suppose there were some kind of atomic
*
catastrophe or great bubonic plague or something of the sort andthe circumstances then changed to living under jungle law. What
then would be good management policy? Obviously, it would be verydifferent. What we now call good management policy would then be
absolutely stupid and ruinous. You can trust people according to
Theory Y in a wealthy society in which there is plenty of money,
plenty of goods, plenty of good, but obviously you cannot trust peo-
ple with a key to the pantry when most people are starving, or when
there is not enough food to go around. What would I then do under
such circumstances? Well, I’m very clear about it in my own mind.
If there were one hundred people and there was food for ten, and
ninety of these hundred had to die
,
then I would make mighty god-
damned sure that I would not be one of those ninety, and I’m quite
sure that my morals and ethics and so on would change very radically
to fit the jungle situation rather than the previous situation of
wealth in which these principles once had worked well. (1965 do
70-71) ’
'
Maslow goes on to tell us that as a consequence of this jungle
world view authoritarian tendencies and practices would have a greater
natural following.
I showed there that if the jungle world view was in fact correct,
then the only realistic thing to be was authoritarian. I was try-
ing to show how it was not crazy, but that it was really all sensi-
ble and logical and rational and even necessary if one granted the
original premise that life was a jungle and the people in it were
jungle animals with mutually exclusive interests. (1965, p. 98)
From Lewin's (1948) and Mas low's (1965) analysis, one sees an
ability to make the connection between the threat to the values referred
to in Question 1 and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles
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and public issues. They do not stress, however, as Laing (1965) and
Marcuse (1964) do the dangers of social issues becoming defined purely
as personal troubles. This works against social change by making the
single situation or particular cause the sole object of critical study
and treatment, rather than the social system which often helped cause
the problem.
Question 4: Are people generally aware and concerned about the
threat to these values or do they define the personal
troubles and public issues they experience in terms
of other values?
Lewin does not seem to be concerned about a strong threat within
the United States to the values of democracy and freedom of choice.
Though acknowledging problems in the United States such as prejudice
against minority groups (e.g., Negroes, Jews, etc.), economic and social
discrimination, Lewin had basic faith in America to eventually resolve
these issues. Since Lewin 's other frame of reference was Nazi Germany,
he tended to rate the United States high in these values.
Lewin states:
Closely related to the respect for the rights of the child is the
tendency of American education to help the child in every way to
become practically independent as soon as possible. Much care is
taken to develop means and techniques which permit the child to
dress himself, to feed and serve himself, and to perform other parts
of the daily routine independently. Similar tendencies are common
to progressive education in all countries, but the actual freedom
of choice and the actual degree of independence intended by the
adult, and reached by the child, seem to be considerably higher in
the United States than in a comparable German milieu. (1948, pp. 8-9)
Lewin elaborates elsewhere:
Such cases are small yet significant criteria for the greater "re-
spect" which the American has for the other individual. They show
that the aversion against interfering with children, which we have
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“ th* *duca“°nal fields, is but an expression o£ a dif-ferent basic relation between the individuals in the United Statesand Germany The difference is obviously closely related to theAmerican s ideal or democracy, to the idea that fundamentally everyperson has the same right, regardless of whether he is rich or poortne President, or an average citizen. The same lack of submissive-’
ness which appears in the relation between child and adult is charac-teristic of the behavior of the American employee toward his employ-
er, or of the student toward his professor. (1948, pp. 14-15)
Since Lewin seemed to identify positively with American society,
he showed a tendency to define personal troubles and public issues in
terms of the normative standards and needs of American society. For ex-
ample, as previously discussed, Lewin bought into the supposed need of
American industry for higher productivity, and dealt with this by attend-
ing to the human relations factor within the industry. He correctly rea-
soned that when this factor was left unnoticed by management, it could
often have detrimental effects on productivity.
In analyzing Maslow's response to Question 4, one sees that al-
though he believes that the conditions existing in America are basically
favorable to synergic institutional arrangements, he has qualms about
the short-sightedness of the goals and concerns that many management
theorists and practitioners operate from. Maslow states:
It is really fantastic that one book after another will make a pious
statement about this new development and about organizational theory
and management theory all resting on a new knowledge and a new con-
ception of human nature and especially of motivation, and then pro-
ceed to say nothing whatsoever about values and purposes. . .
I've seen very few of these managers or writers on organizational
theory who have the courage to think in far terms, in broad-range
terms, in utopian terms, in value terms. Generally, they feel they
are being hard-headed if they use as the criteria of management suc-
cess or of healthy organization the criteria of smaller labor turn-
over or less absenteeism or better morale or more profit or the like.
But in so doing, they neglect the whole eupsychian growth and self-
actualization and personal development side of the enlightened enter-
prise. (1965, pp. 39-40)
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Question 5: What are the levers for change?
Lewin describes the following levers to be used for the purpose
of democratizing:
1. He argues that trained democratic leadership is needed in key
power positions. For Lewin, the crucial determinant of demo-
cratic group atmosphere lies in democratic leadership. Lewin
does not assume that people, if left alone, will follow demo-
cratic practices; it needs to be learned. Nor does Lewin assume
that if sub leaders in organizations (e.g., foreran) practice
democratic principles, but the powers above them (e.g., manage-
ment) do not, will these subleaders be able to sustain the ef-
fectiveness of their democratic practice. (Lewin, 1948, pp . 38-
40)
2. Since the democratic process is a complex one to learn not only
must democratic leaders be trained in their roles, but the fol-
lowers must be trained in the roles of democratic membership.
Democratic membership requires voluntary participation of an ac-
tive, informed, and responsible nature. This is important be-
cause the ultimate goal of a democratic leader is to become in-
evitably less of a leader to be replaced by indigenous leader-
ship developing within the group.
3. To change attitudes and behavior, Lewin stresses the utility of
small groups. The group to which the individual belongs and de-
velops a positive identification, which serves as a frame of
reference and reward system for his perceptions, feelings, and
actions
.
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4. Action research: Lewin
to be tested in action.
believes that the worth of a theory is
Research should have an active compo-
nent and people should be prepared to reevaluate and study con
tinually the results of their action as new data becomes avail
able. In group work, this was often done by continually observ-
ing and feeding back the results of their observation for veri-
fication. It means that group members had to develop participant
observer skills; to remain active while at the same time being ob
jective enough to examine data with a minimum of bias and distor-
tion
.
5. Lewin also stresses the need to understand and deal with the
general cultural atmosphere" if one wishes to maintain and sus-
tain the changes produced within any subsystem of the culture.
The changes produced within the subsystem must be made congruent
with some basic aspects of the general culture in which these in-
dividuals or group live.
Lewin states:
Once a given level is established, certain self- regulatory processes
come into function which tend to keep group life on that level. One
speaks of work habits, established customs," "the accepted way of
doing things. Special occasions may bring about a momentary rise of
production, a festival may create for a day or two a different social
atmosphere between management and workers, but quickly the effect of
the "shot in the arm" will fade out and the basic constellation of
forces will re-establish the old forms of everyday living. (1948,
p. 46)
Lewin summarizes the issue:
A cultural change in regard to a specific item will have to be able
to stand up against the weight of the thousand and one items of the
rest of the culture which tends to turn the conduct back to its old
pattern. As someone has put it, "Culture are pretty water-tight."
We may conclude: To be stable, a cultural change has to penetrate
more or less into all aspects of a nation’s life. The change must,
in short, be a change in the "cultural atmosphere," not merely a
change of single items. (1948, p. 48)
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Hence, for Lewln, lasting changes involved cultural changes
which lead him to view re-education as basically a task of acculturation.
The re-educative process must affect the individual in the following
three realms: (1) cognitive structure; (2) values; (3) actions. These
changes, to be effective, cannot occur in a piecemeal fashion independent-
ly of each other, but must be going on simultaneously within the framework
of the individual's total life situation.
The basic medium for these changes is the creation of a new "in-
group" and the "feeling of belongingness" that it provides. Within this
group, a democratic atmosphere is to be created, with the power constel-
lations in the group supporting this atmosphere, and the methods of lead-
ership employed being consistent with it.
Maslow discusses the following levers for change:
1. A frame of reference based on "feasible" utopian values. Human
potential values that he believes have a real potential to be
actualized in our society. The basic principles from which
Maslow operates are that people can live at various levels in
the motivation hierarchy from the extreme of a survival jungle-
like existence to life in an eupsychian society where all basic
needs are met and life is devoted towards achieving higher levels
of human development. Maslow uses these higher-need levels as a
reference point to be strived for. This is the level of esteem
and self-esteem where concern is centered around issues of dig-
nity, autonomy, self-respect, feelings of worth, etc.
2. Maslow argues for the establishment of a moral and ethical ac-
counting system where tax credits are given to institutions that
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help Improve society and tax penalties are assessed against
those whose work are at odds with social betterment. This Is
based on the assumption that American Institutions have an ob-
ligation and responsibility to Improve the community and envi-
ronment of which they are a part. This would force Institutions
to think beyond their short-run interests (e.g., profit, produc-
tivity, etc.) and be concerned with the long range health of
their system. They would be interested in how well their insti-
tutions contribute to the development of self-actualized people,
both in terms of their employees and the clients they service.
Self-actualization in this sense would extend to people becoming
better citizens, better husbands and wives, and in general, more
fully human.
3. His model requires the modification of economic theory and prac-
tice in line with Eupsy chian Principles:
A. This would entail society guaranteeing or making readily and
cheaply available the basic needs to eat, sleep, and have
shelter. This would permit people to be freed to concentrate
on attaining higher levels of human development.
B. A fair, free, and open market where the best product would be
most likely chosen.
C. Unlimited production at low prices rather than limited pro-
duction with high profit.
4. Mas low supports the utilization of a synergic frame of reference.
Synergy is the concept he uses to stand for the institutional
equivalent of psychological health within individuals. It thus
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provides a powerful instrument for classifying the institutions.
It is based on a sense of partnership existing between the indi-
vidual and institution, and the institution and society, so that
interests and goals merge instead of remaining separate, opposed,
or mutually exclusive. It is a resolution of the dichotomy be-
tween selfishness and unselfishness, private interests and public
interests in terms of a higher unity and interrelatedness. It is
achieved by institutional arrangements so that when an individual
is pursuing his own goals, he is automatically helping others,
and when he is being altruistic, he is automatically rewarded.
5. In Maslow's judgment, treating people well spoils them for being
treated badly. Giving people good conditions spoils them for bad
conditions
.
6. He advocates a holistic approach to social improvement. Systems
change as a whole or unit, with parts of system being interre-
lated to each other. Real social change involves simultaneous
changes xn all parts, e.g., individuals, groups, institutions,
technology, etc. Maslow believes changes in industrial institu-
tions have widest repercussions, but this would still require
corresponding changes in other institutions in order to sustain
industrial changes. The implications of all this are that
eupsychian management principles cannot spread unless society
is ready for them. This would invo 1 ve our technology being
ready for them, management and workers being ready for them,
politicians being ready for them, schools being ready for them,
etc. In terms of leadership, it means giving up the notion of
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the Messiah" or great leader who can take care
and instead accepting significant social change
slow, and complex process.
of everything,
as an arduous
,
In comparing the levers for change described by Lewin (1948) and
Maslow (1965) with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), one sees that
there is a great deal of overlap. At times, the terms are different but
the concepts are often the same.
The following are a list of levers for change emphasized by Laing
(1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), but not by Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965).
1 ‘ A_demystifi cation of experience through an awareness of authentic
personal and social sources of oppression and conflict.
2. Consciousness of social indoctrination and oppressi on and aware-
ness of how we are preconditioned to want to: (1) produce;
(2) consume; (3) compete; (4) possess, etc. in keeping with
current technological and economic needs of our social system.
3. Recognition of the vulnerability to cooptation of oppositional
and transcending alternatives through their wholesale encorpora-
tion into the established order. The ideal becomes prostituted
through the depletion of its oppositional and substantive values
while its form (i.e., technology) is reproduced and displayed on
a massive scale. In this way, the rationality of its protest
against the established order is absorbed and the potentially
transcending alternative ends up supporting the existing social
order.
4. A sense of distance and detachment from society's current values
and operation. Empathy and identification must be replaced by
72
estrangement and dissociation. Through this process, the cur-
rent social order can then be critically judged as one possible
historical practice among many.
5
‘
—
generalizing potential of human problems
, m lts generalls-
ability, a particular problem can become a manifestation of a
larger social system issue. The more a particular problem lends
itself to being generalizable
,
the more correct it is to trans-
late it from the realm of a personal trouble into a public issue.
If a problem is truly unique and idiosynaratic, it is correct to
formulate it as a personal trouble.
In analyzing the levers for change omitted by Lewin (1948) and
Maslow (1965), certain patterns emerge. Omissions of levers number 1
and number 5 indicates a lack of criticalness by Lewin (1948) and Maslow
(1965) in differentiating between legitimate personal and social sources
of oppression and conflict. From this, there follows a lack of adequate
guidelines for distinguishing personal troubles from social issues. It
is important to make this distinction between personal troubles and
social issues because this helps determine whether the appropriate level
°f intervention is at a small (e.g., individual, work group, family, etc.)
or large system (e.g., institution, community, culture) level. Hence,
this initial lack of clarity about "how to define" the problem eventually
results in confusion about "how to resolve" it.
Omission of levers numbers 2, 3, and 4 shows a limited under-
standing by Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) of large social and technolog-
ical sources of oppression and conflict. Along with this, there exists
a "vulnerability" of the human relations movement to cooptation since
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there is no clear statement warning about the dangers of protest absorp
tion by society against threatening alternatives. In analyzing level
number 4, one can understand (at least in part) why Lewin (1948) and
Maslow (1965) tended not to develop a critical perspective on American
society. Both of these men seemed to identify positively with the
American culture and hence did not develop the necessary sense of dis-
tance and detachment needed for an encompassing social critique.
CHAPTER V
A REPRESENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LABORATORY
TRAINING PRACTICES AS APPLIED TO LARGE SOCIAL SYSTEM
Social-Experiential-Critical Analysis as Applied
to Selected Writings of Argyris and Klein
Question 1 : Wh at values are really threatened in our present society ?
Klein (1968) answers this question in terms of his concern for
the mental health of the community. He defines community as:
The community
,
as I now see it, may be defined as patterned interac-
tions within a domain of individuals seeking to achieve security and
physical safety, to desire support at times of stress, and to gain
selfhood and significance throughout the life cycle. The definitions
rest on interactions of individuals rather than on the social organ-
izations whose nature and functions are a manifestation of those in-
teractions. The term domain is used to refer both to a physical
place that can be geographically located and to a social-psychological
place (such as a community of interest) that is phenomenologically
real to those who inhabit it. The view of community on which this
book is based is not that community is man’s habitat. Rather, com-
munity is man in habitat, for the habitat is not meaningful without
its inhabitants. (Klein, 1965, p. 11)
The issue of mental health for Klein centers around the quality
of the "processes" through which the community deals with its problems
and makes decisions that affect the individual inhabitant's well-being.
Klein states:
I believe that the goal of a mentally healthy society—leaving aside
whatever this rhetoric may mean to you, me, or any other set of vi-
sionaries—is not the kind of final outcome that can be attained by
agencies and programs. Rather it is the kind of objective that is
achieved or lost by the very nature of the processes by which such
agencies and programs are developed. It is the quality of those
processes with which I hope you are or will become most concerned.
For it is how the community goes about meeting problems and making
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decisions that affects its citizen's social
at least as much as, if not more than, the ntturH^thf
Wf J:beln8or decisions. (1964, p. viii
,
Preface) Solutions
What is significant in Klein's (1968) definition of mental health
is that health is basically not conceived of in intra-psychic terms but
rather in terms of the "community" as an entity that causes hazards in
living and also provides the potential means for positively coping with
these hazards. What is also significant is that Klein is not primarily
interested in the specific solutions, outcomes, and decisions reached by
a community in dealing with its problems, but by the "means" or "proces-
ses" of interaction it uses.
Klein stresses a "collaborative approach" toward community prob-
lem-solving which is a joint venture involving all significant parties
affected by the problem and makes provisions for sharing of responsibil-
ities and creates opportunities for each participant to mutually influ-
ence the other. He sees the collaborative approach as linked with the
promotion of mental health and contrasts this with the "authoritative
approach with its emphasis on expert—subordinate relationships which he
feels has a detrimental effect on mental health. Klein states:
In the long run, however, a reliance on the authority from the top
can have serious consequences for community life. The basis for this
belief is in the definition of community advanced at the onset; that
it is an interactive domain whose inhabitants are concerned with se-
curity and safety, significance, and finding the solutions to the
many problems of living. An individual's life today can be affected
overnight in massive ways by decisions to re-malce the physical char-
acteristics and institutions of his environment. When these are
brought about without involvement either of himself or of those whom
he trusts, the community (in the eyes of the citizen) becomes less
secure and safe, less concerned with his significance, and more
fraught with uncertainties that are added to all the other problems
of life. There are many instances of community conflict and disrup-
tion of needed programs to show that the alienation of the individual
weakens the community. (1968, p. 141)
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Klein is committed to fostering the collaborative processes with-
in the community, for he sees them as the natural means leading toward
more integrative patterns of community life. Integrative patterns refer
to the ways in which individuals relate to each other and to the commun-
ity as well as the ways community resources are coordinated for the com-
mon good. Klein states:
High integration is reflected by a shared sense that there is a posi-tively valued common destiny which binds people together. Opportun-lties for participation m community affairs are felt to exist forall levels and segments of the population. Residents know that itis possible for groups to put aside differences in order to cope
with overriding problems. There is a sense of self-worth that is
refiected in the belief that outsiders view the community and itsinhabitants positively. (1968, p. 164)
Klein also sees collaborative processes and high integration as
having the positive effect of promoting conditions favorable for free-
dom of choice (which Klein values) and of providing opportunities for
people to influence and actively cope with their environment. The over-
aH 80a^ Klein sees for the mental health worker is community improvement
based on a deep respect for the processes that lead to community inte-
grity. Klein states:
Respect for community integrity goes beyond the needed understanding
of the roles, functions, programs, goals, and values within each of
the key agencies and institutions of the community. It also embraces
a concern for the quality of the basic processes which are fundamental
to the community's welfare by which I mean such things as the manner
in which policy is shaped and decisions made, interactions between
different groups are facilitated, communication of information and
values is fostered, and leadership encouraged to develop and deal
with the myriad problems of community life. (1968, p. 203)
Argyris (19 70) answers Question 1 mainly in terms of the threat
to the capacity of our institutions to be hedlthy and self-renewing.
Argyris states:
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One of the most urgently needed intellectual crash programs is thatof developing new designs of technology, administrative c^trols andleadership styles that will lead to organizations capable of bei^productive and self-renewing, of being effective, and of encouragingif actualization among the participants. Unless research is con-"ducted immediately and unless workable models become available, westand a good chance of being the society who could organize to sendmen to the moon but could not organize so that man’s highest human
aspirations could be fulfilled. (1970, p. 4)
Hence, from the above quotation, it is quite apparent why Argyris
makes the following commitment to creating conditions in institutions
favorable to system competence and effectiveness. Argyris maintains:
The core activities of any system are: (1) to achieve its objec-
tives; (2) to maintain its internal environment; and (3) to adapt
to, and maintain control over the relevant external environment.
How well the system accomplishes these core activities in any given
situation indicates its effectiveness.
A key issue for an interventionist is to know how to help the client
system, through the intervention system, increase its competence and
effectiveness as it strives to accomplish its three core activities
(19 70, p. 36)
Argyris provides the answer to the issue he raises with the
following summary:
A system behaves competently to the extent that it solves problems,
makes decisions, and implements decisions effectively. Six criteria
of system competence are: (1) awareness of relevant information;
(2) understanding by the relevant parts; (3) manipulability
;
(4) realistic cost; (5) leading to a solution that prevents reoccur-
ence of the problem without deteriorating; and (6) preferably increas-
ing the problem-solving, decision-making, and implementing processes.
In order to achieve the criteria given, it is necessary to develop
certain minimal conditions among individuals (self-acceptance, trust
of others, confirmation, essentiality, psychological success); about
valid information (directly verifiable information—that is, minimal-
ly attributive, evaluative, and contradictory); and among groups
(shared leadership, identification with group process) as well as
achievement of task, experimentation, and risk-talcing among inter-
group (problem-solving interdependence that minimizes destructive
win-lose dynamics) and system norms that support these activities.
(19 70, pp. 47-48)
In comparing the combined answers of Argyris (1970) and Klein
(1968) with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), there seems to be an
78
overlap in terms of their valuing freedom of choice and self-determina-
tion and the need for people to maximize their human potential. There
is also some agreement in acknowledging that a conflict exists between
the values these critics are expousing and the way American society is
organized. However, the analysis of the conflict is not as extensive
and encompassing for Argyris (19 70) and Klein (1970) as it is for Laing
and Marcuse. Klein tends to see the conflict as existing between com-
munity processes and individual needs, and Argyris tends to focus on the
conflict between institutional systems and individual aspriations.
Hence, for these two laboratory practitioners, social change is
basically not defined in terms of quantitative "societal" change as Laing
and Marcuse tend to do; but rather for Klein in terms of "community im-
provement" and for Argyris in terms of "organizational system competence
and effectiveness."
Question 2 : By whom or by what are these values threatened ?
Klein tells us that one threat to community improvement is when
any one of the following four basic processes becomes dysfunctional:
1. Communication Process : Threats to good communication in the
community include:
a) social distance and stereotyping;
b) high levels of emotionality such as cherished beliefs are
threatened
;
c) fragmentation of information, etc.
2. Decision-Making : Threats to good decision-making in the commun-
ity include:
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a) not involving those significantly effected by the decision
(or their representatives) in the decision-making process;
b) not taking into account either the social and emotional fac-
tors or technical considerations needed to make an appropri-
ate decision;
c) yes-no approaches which tend to polarize the community and
create win-lose situations.
Boundary Maintenance; function of regulating the passage of
people or ideas between or within regions of the community.
Boundary maintenance threatened by:
a) rapid influx of large group of newcomers;
b) urban sprawl, etc.
4. Systemic Linkage : how different systems are related to one an-
other, and how parts of the same system are related. Systemic
linkage is threatened when:
a) the interdependence between and within systems is not made
explicit
;
b) the goals of the different systems or within one system are
not compatible.
A second major threat to community improvement is the appearance
of disintegrative forces in community life which include the following:
1. Economic or other disasters which affect the basic means of live-
lihood;
2. Health epidemics;
3. Extensive poverty;
4. Infusion of diverse cultural backgrounds where there is no pre-
paratory value synthesis;
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5. Extensive migration of new groups;
6. Rapid social change threatening to many of the traditional pat-
terns of community life.
A third major threat to community improvement are malevolent,
self-perpetuating forms of community conflict.
Klein describes the process:
... It is accomplished by a tendency to polarize— to simplify
issues into right and wrong, decisions into yes or no, group andindividuals into for and against or good and bad. It is difficult,
often impossible, to identify with or develop empathy for one's an-
tagonists in a conflict situation. Concomitantly, there is a
strengthening of loyalties and ties within each of the warring fac-
tions. Between opposing groups, there is distrust. Often each
group projects all that is bad onto the opposition.
. . . Each
stereotypes the other as inherently evil, unprincipled, or at the
very least, misguided. ... As events develop, the issue changes
from specific to general disagreements; disagreement becomes direct
antagonism; and in the ultimate conflict situation, the community
itself becomes split into warring camps. (1968, pp. 152-153)
Argyris answers Question 2 in terms of the conditions that lead
to organizational deterioration and entropy. Argyris states:
To summarize, man has the dubious honor of brilliantly designing
human organizations that are destined to follow a course similar to
that illustrated in the second law of thermodynamics and slowly de-
teriorate. He has compounded the felony by evolving change strate-
gies that produce change but at the cost of reinforcing the organi-
zational entropy. What has saved us from disaster is that the
processes of organizational entropy have been slow, and change at-
tempts comparatively few. The problem is tragic and urgent because
these processes have reached the point of taking an increasing toll
of ‘the organizations and their participants at the very time of
rising human aspirations. (19 70
,
p. 7)
One specific cause of organizational deterioration and entropy
is the ineffective interpersonal skills people learn which tend to gener-
ate invalid information.
Argyris states:
To summarize, man learns early in life to generate information in in-
terpersonal situations that is attributive, evaluative, and communicated
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in infe rred categories. According to our modelincrease the probability for creating ineffeet •
’
h condl tions
lationships and invalid information.
^ lnterPerSonal re-
Assuming that our model is valid, why would people be taught to behave m a manner hypothesized to be dysfunctional? One ht
suggested is that man tends to create in hi<?
ypo lesis
an interpersonal world or milieu i^h^prl£^£2^ ^perxmenting, taking risks, helping others to own up to the^ Ideas
conre
6el
f
n8S
f
^ exP e rimenti*g , and norms of trust orc rn or feelings are rarely observed. In this world (labeledpatter A), there xs a tendency for individuals to be less aware ofe relevant factors operating in critical situations and to be lesseffective xn understandxng the behaviors of others, thus to feel ageneral tendency of ambiguity and lack of clarity about othersThe result is a basic tendency for individuals to withhold or distortinformation about important or difficult issues. (19 70, p. 49)
Argyris (1970) tells us that these ineffective behavioral skills
are supported and sustained by collaborating organizational structures,
administrative controls, and leadership styles used by those in power.
In discussing the workers relationship to the overall organiza-
tional structure, Argyris states: "The more rigidity, specialization,
tight control, and directive leadership the worker experiences, the more
he will tend to create antagonistic adaptive activities." (1970, p. 59)
In discussing current administrative control practices, Argyris
(1970) states:
The underlying assumptions of these managerial controls are that:
(1) management (through some staff experts) plans and controls human
effort; (2) the control of human effort is manageable by logic, and
systematically developed by relatively quantitative techniques; and
(3) this latter is achieved by the use of the principles of exception,
which means behavior is monitored (on a sample basis) and investigated
when it deviates from the plan. (1970, p. 60)
Argyris summarizes the effect of these controls:
In short, managerial controls tend to create group rivalries, force
groups to think of their own and not the other’s problems, reward
an overall point of view rarely, and place groups in win-lose situa-
tions in which they are competing with each other for the scarce re-
sources. (19 70, p. 62)
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In discussing the prevailing philnsnnh\r8 1 Ll0S0Phy of management leadership,
Argyris states:
^:de“
de
^:\SiLos :preys?Lrr\r2rnts tends to be to •««**
Of the py rami dal^s t ruct ure ^
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cSL
er^“d
r»
be
tT likert CallS "Pto^oct ion--centered^"
To 5
8 Theory X, and Argyris calls "directive leadership "Leaders are urged to be strong, to drive spH „
.
ployees to increase their productivity and loyally
6 SJw ^
with getting. the facts and controlling the problem-solvingt^ecision-aking, and implementation processes. They are also charged withevaluating the performer and the individuals and groups. Researchhas shown that such leadership results in a decrease of the indi^d-uai s experience of psychological success and essentiality, and ofthe probability that he will give valid information to those aboveor to his peers. Such leadership also tends to increase the fre-quency of destructive win-lose interdepartmental rivalries. (1970,
In summary, Argyris is very explicit in showing us how worker
behavioral skills, the organizational structure, managerial controls, and
executive leadership styles are all synchronized in such a manner that
the conditions leading to system competence tend to be inhibited while
opposite conditions are facilitated.
In comparing Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968) with Marcuse (1964)
and Laing (1965, 1967), one sees similarities in Argyris’ position with'
that of Marcuse and Laing. The logic and functionality of people acting
in highly—competitive
,
closed, and distrustful ways given the nature of
organizational structure and collaborating socialization mechanisms
found in the world of work is discussed by Argyris, but not by Klein in
any systematic way. However, Argyris basically limits his analysis to
institutional dynamics and behavior and never really touches the larger
question of how institutional dynamics are related to the overall tech-
nological base of American society. Nor do Argyris or Klein discuss
other collaborating socialization mechanisms (e.g., family, school system)
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and their relationships with the world of work and our society's current
technological needs and priorities. Hence, what is crucially lacking in
Argyris' (1970) and Klein's (1968) analyses are the dynamics of the sys-
temic linkages that exist between our self-perpetuating, pseudo-scarcity
oriented technology and our collaborating socialization mechanisms and
the individuals 's actions, attitudes, and social roles.
Question 3 : What is the connection between the threat to these val-
ues and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles
and public issues ?
Klein (1968) answers this question in relation to the primary
thesis of his book; namely, that the community as an entity gives rise
both to emotional problems (i.e., personal trouble) in living, and to the
potential means for successfully coping with them. When patterns of com-
munity living become disintegrative (i.e., public issue), it often mani-
fests itself in symptoms of social pathology. Examples of such symptoms
include a relatively high frequency of broken homes, crime and juvenile
delinquency, dissolution of friendships and close associations, increase
of hostile expressions and behavior. Hence, for Klein, how community
needs and processes are handled will have significant implications for
psychological well-being.
Argyris sees the threat to organizational competence and effect-
iveness manifesting itself in terms of personal troubles of the worker:
(1) apathy, (2) mistrust, (3) indifference, (4) gold-bricking, (5) ab-
senteeism, (6) alienation, (7) aggression and anger toward bosses
through direct and indirect means, (8) the difficulty workers have in
developing competence in dealing with feelings and interpersonal
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relationships since such behavior is usually not supported by institu-
tional reward systems. Organisational value of rationality and suppres-
sion of feelings may eventually lead to a barrenness of creative Intel-
lectual ideas as well as values
.
Argyns sees the threat to organizational competence and effec-
tiveness manifesting itself in terms of some of the following public
issues: (1) the demands of youth for change in institutions so as to
live up to their ideals; (2) demands of racial minorities and poor for
more responsive institutions; (3) citizens and employee impatience and
anger leading to destructive actions on their part and inadequate respon
ses of administrators who often become apathetic themselves.
In comparing Argyris' (1970) and Klein’s (1968) answer to
Question 3 with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), one sees a joint
acknowledgement of alienation as a problem but Argyris and Klein do not
give this problem the singular importance that Laing and Marcuse do.
From Argyris’ (19 70) and Klein's (1968) analyses, one also sees an abil-
ity to make the connection between the threat to the values they refer
to in Question 1 and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles
and social issues. Also, Argyris and Klein both show clearly the abil-
ity to avoid the danger of defining social system issues in terms of
personal troubles.
Question 4 : Are people generally aware and concerned about the
threat to these values
,
or do they define the person-
al troubles and public issues they experience in terms
of other values
?
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Klein (1968) tells us that people in the field of mental health
are generally unaware of the issues raised by "community" concepts of
mental health. They tend to define mental health issues in terms of
individual needs, conflicts, and defense mechanisms or as small group
problems (e.g., family dynamics) having to do with such phenomena as
problems of authority, breakdown in communication, cohesiveness, etc.
Such approaches Klein (1968) feels miss the more significant patterned
interactions and gestalts that make up community life.
Klein (1968)
,
in the following example raises the issues he be-
lieves the field of mental health has not yet fully confronted:
I believe that the most fundamental questions for the mental health
team are those having to do with how the many human needs of the
population of this community are being met. The question refers to
the entire hierarchy of needs from basic food and shelter to the most
lofty ones of self-esteem and creativity. It has taken us too long,
for example, to recognize the relative futility of such efforts as°
providing mental health consultation to educators working with Negro
and other disadvantaged children who are convinced that even the
education, they are effectively barred from the job market as opposed
to doing something about removing the economic barriers themselves.
We must learn to ask the kinds of questions that will enable us to
recognize the limitations of a program of premarital counseling in
an urban setting that fails in the first place to provide sufficient
opportunities for mate finding and selection.
It is important to enter the community with the recognition that one
of its basic functions is to provide for the many and varied needs
of its inhabitants; specialized and scarce mental health talents will
be brought to bear most effectively only as we ask ourselves and the
community, " Which needs are not being met and why?" (1968, pp. 26-
27)
Argyris (19 70) tells us that people generally are not aware of
the conditions threatening organizational competence and effectiveness.
They tend to define the problems they experience in terms of previously
developed normative standards. Argyris describes the issue thusly:
. . .
For example, about ten years ago, the top leaders of one of
our largest utilities were warned of increasing organizational rigid-
ities unless they reversed the impact of their administrative controls,
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norms against open discussion of conflict, and paternalistic nerson-
7 1C1T cThe Uarnl" S ' repeated at ^veral meetings, «s ?g!nored largely because the officers could not see or idLkfy th!conditions worrying the behavioral scientists.
Although a few business leaders have spoken out in an attempt to
attack causes, most of them have responded by increasing produc-tivxty through new technological advances and passing on costs inthe form of higher prices. These reactions can be found in many
organizations. (1970, pp. 2-3)
Argyris goes on to tell us that one of the most fundamental con-
ditions often existing within the relationship between the intervention-
ist and client is the underlying discrepancy in the behavioral values of
the interventionist and the client, and in the criteria each uses to
judge effectiveness. Argyris elaborates:
The interventionist holds views that tend to be different from the
client's about effective relationships. For example, the interven-
tionist tends to emphasize the importance of owning-up to, being
open, and experimenting with ideas and feelings within a milieu^
whose norms include individuality, concern, and trust. The thrust
of many client systems, in the name of effectiveness, is to inhibit
these variables and emphasize defensive, relatively closed, non-
experimenting activities as well as norms that include conformity,
mistrust, and antagonism.
The second discrepancy lies in the fact that the members of the cli-
ent system tend to be unaware of the extent to which they are respon-
sible for these conditions of ineffectiveness. Their tendency is to
blame the system. Moreover, although many clients may berate these
conditions, they also tend to view them as inevitable and natural,
a view not shared by the interventionist.
The third discrepancy is desirable from the first two. The inter-
ventionist and the client system tend to hold discrepant views about
the nature of strong leadership and effective organizations. They
tend to value different human qualities as resources to build upon
and make the foundations for change. For example, established manage-
ment usually defines directive, controlling, task-oriented, ration-
ally focussed as organization. The interventionist believes that
such characteristics are most effective under certain conditions and
that under a different set of conditions, effective leaders and or-
ganizations are able to create conditions for genuine participation
and psychological success, where the expression of relevant feelings
are legitimate. (1970, p. 128)
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In comparing Argyris' (1970) and Klein's (1968) answer to
Question 4 with Laing's (1965, 1967) and Marcuse's (1964), one sees a
similarity in terms of their analyses of the general public’s lack of
awareness and insight into the true conditions threatening cherished
values. There is also agreement on the tendency for people to define
their problems in relationship to previously established normative stan-
dards
.
Question 5 : What are the levers for change ?
Klein (1968) answers this question when he states:
Ultimately
,
the overall goal of a community-oriented mental health
center becomes that of community improvement. The major efforts
and energies of the mental health team then becomes devoted to gain-ing a better understanding of basic community processes and to devel-
oping the means for making them more conducive to the emotional well-being of individuals. (1968, p. 199)
Hence, for Klein, the key levers for change involve interventions
to facilitate healthy community processes (patterns). The following are
3- list of some of the key activities Klein advocates for community men-
tal health workers:
1. He advocates the reduction of the cleavages and distrust preva-
lent in community life which are often correlated with indices
of social and emotional pathology. Klein advocates that the
mental health worker act as a "bridge" between disparate and
conflicting segments of the community. When conflict is be-
tween the community and large regional, state, and national or-
ganizations, Klein advocates the role of a "linking pin" to
connect the concerns of the community with these other groups.
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2. Klein advocates the community mental health worker serve as a
developer of human resources within the community. He believes
they should try to identify, support, and cultivate the talents
of potential community leadership. This involves training of
volunteers and professionals for civic leadership and competence.
3. Klein suggests that the community mental health worker should
encourage the community to build evaluation into any planned
community action sequence. Klein argues further:
Handled properly, evaluation of community action can serve as a use-
ful aid to those involved. Ideally, data collection and feedback
should be attempted at every step along the way. The information
sought should be of the kind that will facilitate understanding of
the goals being sought, the extent to which those involved believe
that progress has been made toward their goals, and their percep-
tions of problems still to be faced, steps to be taken, and the like.
This kind of evaluation research is incorporated within the action
system itself; the data, which are made available to all concerned,
sre part of the mechanisms which determines the appropriate steps to
be taken. (1968, p. 191)
4. Some of the basic community processes that Klein feels the com-
munity mental health worker should have a working knowledge of
and an ability to facilitate include the following:
a) How community policy is shaped and decisions made;
b) Interactions between diverse community groups;
.c) Communication of information and values;
d) How community leadership is fostered and encouraged to deal
with the myriad problems of community life.
5
An issue that Klein sees of special importance is the management
of conflict through rational means. Conflict is seen as an in-
evitable part of community living but constructive community ac-
tion cannot result from extreme and destructive forms of conflict.
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Therefore, Klein believes that a community must develop suitable
and non-destructive means for allowing conflict to occur or face
the danger of reduced community integration. One approach to
conflict management that Klein discusses is based on an anal-
ysis of the communication patterns and processes. Klein states:
The basic assumption underlying the communication approach to con-flict resolution is derived from psychotherapeutic experience andintergroup experiences in the religious, racial, and industriallelds
. It holds that mutual exploration by the factions of pre-
viously uncharted depths leads to rational understanding of the
nature of the problem; that with increased understanding comes bet-ter organization of controls, more effective channels of communica-
tion, and therefore more opportunities to secure relevant informa-
tion, leading in the end to the institution of better patterns for
solving future problems. (1968, p. 159)
Argyris (1970) answers this question in terms of a process of
consulting he calls "intervention." He describes the three processes
which constitute the primary intervention task.
To summarize, an interventionist is someone who enters an ongoing
system or set of relationships primarily to achieve three tasks.
They are: (1) to help generate valid and useful information; (2)
to create conditions in which clients can make informed and free
choices; and (3) to help clients develop an internal commitment
to their choice. (1970, p. 31)
What is significant about Argyris' approach is that he advocates
the use of these "process" levers no matter what the substantive objec-
tives are for the organization. His commitment is to "process change"
and feels it is a violation of the interventionist role and clients'
"freedom of choice" to tell the client system what criteria of system
success they should use, or what values they should accept or reject.
As long as the client system is working toward fulfilling the three pri-
mary process tasks, Argyris feels they should be aided.
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For Argyris, the "processes" by which system operate are not
separable from the substantive human problems of systems. There is a
basic congruence for Argyris between effective intervention processes
(l.e., primary intervention tasks) and effective client system opera-
tions. To attempt to alter the substantive problems without altering
the processes through which organizations operate would be for Argyris
comparable to making changes without getting at the basic causes.
Argyris describes his approach as it relates to the issue of
change
:
A second implication states that change is not a primary task of theinterventionist. To repeat, the interventionist's primary tasks are
to generate valid information, to help the client system make informed
and responsible choices, and develop internal commitment to these
choices. One choice that the clients may make is to change aspects
of their system. If this choice is made responsibly, the interven-
tionist may help the client to change. However, the point we are
making is that change is not a priori considered good and no change
considered bad. (1970, pp . 21-22)
Argyris elaborates elsewhere:
Focusing on the three primary tasks also helps an interventionist
prevent himself from falling into the trap of being associated ahead
of time with certain types of managerial styles. For example, some
interventionists have written that participation is the most effec-
tive managerial style; that power equalization is good; and that
democratic management is inevitable.
All these statements may or may not be true for the particular client
system being served at this time. It may be that from a careful
analysis, the client system chooses autocracy for certain decisions,
makes the power differential between subordinate and superior even
greater, and decreases the amount of participation under certain con-
ditions. The information needed to support the validity of these
choices will not tend to be generated with the help of an interven-
tionist whose values are already commitcd to the effectiveness of a
particular management style. (1970, p. 24)
In keeping with his commitment to th§ primary tasks, Argyris of-
fers the following model for an interventionist's effectiveness.
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To summarize the preceding discussion represents a model of inter-ven lomst effectiveness. The more an interventionist is able (1)to have confidence in his philosophy of intervening, (2) to regressnimally under stress, (3) to understand and use client attacksconstructively, (4) to trust his own experience of reality and hisrepertoire of skills, and (5) to invest ambiguity with valid mean-ings
,
the greater is the probability that he will help to reducethe resisting forces in the relationship and help the clients andhimself increase the pushing forces toward change. There conditions,m turn, increase the probability that the interventionist will ex-perience himself, and be seen by others as an effective intervention-ist •
... An interventionist who is able to accept his own and his cli-
ents behavior even under conditions of stress will tend to find it
easier to create relationship with the client that can produce ef-
fectiveness in intervention behavior. These behaviors include own-ing up to, being open toward, and experimenting with ideas and feel-
ings. The interventionist strives to communicate and to help others
communicate ideas and feelings by using observed categories and by
minimizing attributions, evaluations, and contradictary comments
(1970, pp. 149-150)
In comparing the levers for change described by Argyris (1970)
and Klein (1968) with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), one sees
that there is a good deal of overlap and some omissions.
The following are a list of levers for change emphasized by
Laing (1965
,
1967) and Marcuse (1964), but not by Argyris (1970) and
Klein (1968).
1. A demystification of experience through an awareness of authen-
tic personal and social sources of oppression and conflict.
2. Consciousness of social indoctrination and oppression and aware-
ness of how we are preconditional to want to (1) produce, (2) con-
sume, (3) compete, (4) possess, etc. in keeping with current
technological and economic needs of our social system.
3. Recognition of the vulnerability to cooptation of oppositional
and transcending alternatives through their wholesale incorpora-
tion into the established order. The ideal becomes prostituted
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through the depletion of its oppositional and substantive values
while its form (i.e., technology) is reproduced and displayed on
a massive scale. In this way, rationality of its protest against
the established order is absorbed and the potentially transcend-
ing alternative ends up supporting the existing social order.
In analyzing levers 1 and 2
,
one realizes that Argyris' and
Klein's analyses of the sources of social conflict and oppression tend
to be an "aborted" one. They do not deal with the sources of conflict
beyond the institutional and community level. Missing from their ap-
proach is a comprehensive analysis of the dynamic interrelationship ex-
isting between the technological and economic base of our society; the
collaborating socialization mechanisms, and individual behavior.
In analyzing the omission of lever 3, one again sees as with
Lewin (1948) and Mas low (1965) how vulnerable to cooptation the field of
laboratory training is. Both Argyris' (1970) and Klein's (1968) down-
play and delete substantive values from their approaches. The "quality
of the processes" employed (e.g., primary intervention tasks, integra-
tive patterns in community life) becomes the "sine qua non" for institu-
tional competence and community improvement. Their approach makes the
fallacious assumption that system processes are inseparable from system
outcomes. It works on the simple formula that if the processes are hu-
mane, and the structures are congruent with these processes, then the
systems are humane. Argyris' and Klein's approach are weak because they
invoke an isolated and encapsulated view of social reality. Argyris,
especially, makes little mention of the responsibility and relationship
of the institution to the larger community, the environment, or democratic
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society. Humane processes and structures can still conceivably lead to
Institutional products such as napalm and community by-products such as
pollution, if the larger technological and economic realities support
these products and by-products. In the long run, can we think in terms
of healthy institutions and communities, and ignore their interrelated-
ness with the overall health and priorities of our technology, economy,
and general culture?
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
"Pr9gress Towards What?"—
"The Laboratory Training Movement"
Before presenting my summary statement, I would like to point
out some important limitations of this study and some of its implications
for theory and research. This study was not intended to be a definitive
and comprehensive analysis of the field of laboratory training. Rather
it sought to be a representative analysis of some of the important social
issues and trends raised by laboratory training's commitment to social
change
.
It is important to keep in mind that by selecting Laing (1965,
1967) and Marcuse (1964) as the contemporary social critics to answer
the questions raised by Mils (1959)
,
I excluded other contemporary crit-
ics who would have answered these questions differently and thus would
have provided a different social frame of reference to analyze laboratory
training. The same could be said for my selection of Argyris (1970),
Klein (1968)
,
Lewin (1948)
,
and Maslow (1965) . Since I have stated else-
where my rationale for selecting the sources I used, the point to be
made here is that other sources in the field of human relations might
have answered Mils (1959) questions differently. Thus my analysis raises
issues and suggests answers but they must be .considered as "qualified"
ones
,
qualified to the extent that the sources I chose to use for my
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methodology and analysis were representative
the important issues and trends in the field
or non-representative of
of laboratory training.
Implications for Theory and Research
1. If laboratory training is to be seen as a force for social change
then its interrelatedness with the larger social system must be
analyzed and studied.
A. The dynamics of the system linkages that exist between the
technology, the collaborating socialization mechanisms, and
the individual s action, attitude, and social role must be
studied and analyzed as they relate to laboratory training
principles and values.
B. The analysis of sources of conflict existing between labora-
tory training values and our society must extend beyond an
isolated institutional and community perspective. It should
incorporate an analysis of the relationship existing between
laboratory values and the predominant cultural values.
2. Laboratory training must clearly differentiate between legiti-
mate personal versus social sources of oppression and conflict.
From this there follows a need to develop and study guidelines
for distinguishing personal troubles from social issues.
3. Laboratory training must develop a consciousness of the sources
of social indoctrination and oppression which precondition people
and limit their freedom of mind, spirit, and choice.
4. Laboratory training must recognize and study the danger of it be-
ing coopted to serve antithetical ends. It must analyze the
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processes of protest absorption and develop guidelines as to
the appropriate and inappropriate use of its methodology in
the selection of its clients.
In developing a concluding statement on the relationship of lab-
oratory training to social change, I have seen the need to tie this to
the overall issue of progress. How one defines progress can be a deter-
mining factor for the type of social changes one advocates. If one ap-
proaches progress as a neutral term, than our society's preoccupation
with change and growth can be considered an indication that we are pro-
gressing. If one views progress as a moral concept, then one might ask
the question, "Progress Towards What?" The latter approach will serve
as the focus for this discussion.
The Human Relations School as exemplified by Kurt Lewin (1948)
has accepted the prevailing American definition of progress in terms of
expanding production and consumption. Lewin's prime concern is the de-
velopment of "means" (i.e., methods) for humanizing the technological
process so that it might more effectively lead to the implementation of
the above definition of progress. Lewin does not seem to question the
direction and end products of technology, nor does he see a strong need
for the establishment of different institutions or new directions for
the productive process. His values are based on the belief and faith
that a basic harmony of interests exists between the good society
(American democracy) and citizen needs and interests. Therefore,
America's values and priorities are seen as basically congruent with the
opportunities and choices open to the individual. Hence, Lewin's com-
mitment to progress is not to qualitative changes but rather to the
97
improvement and adjustments which would hasten the current directions of
progress
.
Lewin's perspective on progress contrasts with Laing (1965, 1967)
and Marcuse (1964) who see a basic conflict of interests existing be-
tween society and the individual. They believe that the vested inter-
ests of our society are organized around the principle of pseudo-scarcity
and competitive-survival which creates a destructive form of the strug-
gle for existence within and between the individual members of that so-
ciety. For Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) continued progress
demands the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and organiza-
tion of progress leading to the establishment of different institutions,
a new direction for the productive process, and new modes of human exis-
tence .
Mas low (1965) (another exemplary of the Human Relations School)
also tends to see a basic harmony of interests between the way American
society is organized and the psychological needs of people. He believes
American society is currently fostering the conditions necessary for op-
timal human development. Unlike Lewin , Maslow's notion of progress does
point to a vision of qualitative social change in the concept of synergy.
Synergy is the term Maslow uses to stand for the institutional equival-
ent of psychological health within individuals. It is a resolution oi
the dichotomy between selfishness and unselfishness, private interests
and public interests in terms of a higher unity and interrelatedness.
It is achieved by institutional arrangements so that when an individual
is pursuing his own goals, he is automatically helping others, and when
he is being altruistic, he is automatically rewarded.
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Mas low's analyses (1965), like Lewin's (1948), minimizes the
threat and conflict existing between the way the technological base of
American society is organized and the establishment of synergic systems.
From Maslow’s (1965) analysis, one sees no mention of how the technolog-
ical base of our society is organized around perpetuating a false sense
of deprivation of basic needs thereby fostering conditions which tend
to fixate people at lower levels of need gratification. By precondition-
ing people to want to produce, and consume, and having planned obsoles-
cence as a basic feature of our economy, conditions are created which
help to perpetuate a pseudo-scarcity, survival orientation which works
against the attainment of higher levels of human development required
for Maslow’s synergic principles to prosper. Hence, Maslow, by minimiz-
the existence of the conflict between the way our society is organ-
ized and human needs, makes the "fallacious assumption" that the direc-
tion of progress he advocates can be achieved basically through estab-
lished institutions with their established priorities. Maslow fails to
realize that institutions organized to serve the "struggle for existence"
can not very well serve the need to optimally develop beyond the exis-
tence level.
In comparing the notion of progress of Argyris (1970) and Klein
(1968), two current laboratory practitioners, one sees some agreement in
acknowledging that a' conflict exists between the values for progress they
are espousing and the way American society is organized. However, the
analysis of the conflict is not as extensive and encompassing for Argyris
(1970) and Klein (1968) as it is for Laing and Marcuse. Klein tends to
see the conflict as existing between community processes and individual
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needs, and Argyris tends to focus on the conflict between institutional
systems and individual needs. Hence, for Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968),
progress is basically not defined in terms of societal change as Laing
and Marcuse tend to do; but rather for Klein in terms of "community im-
provement" and for Argyris in terms of "organizational system competence
and effectiveness."
What is crucially lacking in Argyris' approach (1970) and Klein's
(1968) analysis are the dynamics of the overall system linkages and con-
flicts that exist between our self-perpetuating, pseudo-scarcity, oriented
technology and our collaborating socialization mechanisms and individuals'
actions, attitudes, and social roles.
Within the scope of their definitions of progress, "organization-
al competence and effectiveness" and "community improvement" the quality
of the processes employed by these systems (e.g., primary intervention
tasks, integrative patterns in community) becomes the ultimate criteria
for measuring their progress.
The problem with "process values" becoming the "sine qua non"
for progress rests with judging how complete or inclusive these values
are. Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968), being mainly concerned with a
process methodology (means), are attempting to answer such questions as,
"How to live?" "How a job should be performed?" "How community prob-
lems should be handled?"
The fallacious assumption that Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968)
make is that system processes are inseparable from system outcomes. They
work from the simple formula that if the processes are humane and the
structures are humane, then the systems will be inevitably humane. lhe
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weakness with this approach is that it works fro, an isolated and encap-
sulated view of social reality. Humane processes and structures can
still conveivably lead to inhumane products and by-products.
When one looks at things critically, does it really help society
in the long run if we create "sensitive missile builders" and "empathetic
napalm makers?" Does it really contribute to society's humanity if these
missile builders and napalm makers are divided up into decentralized task
forces whose most influential members are the most technically competent
in the creation of these products? In the long run, does it really con-
tribute to humanity if the laboratory training methodology helps these
workers develop an emotional commitment as well as a task orientation
towards their work?
These "exaggerated” examples highlight a problem that the field
of laboratory training has yet to fully tackle. Should its process meth-
odology be employed to implement effective functioning within perspective;
and goal priorities as currently defined? Jean Hills has pointed to this
dilemma by raising the question of whether behavioral scientists, when
applying their skills to solving organizational problems, tend to perpet-
uate established ideologies and systems because of the blinders imposed
by their limited definition of what constitutes a problem (1965, pp. 23-
40). In the long run, can the field of laboratory training continue to
think in terms of healthy institutions and communities (as Argyris and
Klein tend to do) and ignore their relationship to the overall health
and priorities of our technology, economy, and general culture?
A factor which tends to neutralize laboratory trainers* advocacy
and weds them to established ideologies and priorities is their
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conceptualization of the meaning of "freedom of choice." Argyris (1970)
states very clearly that preserving the freedom of choice of his client
system takes precedence over his advocacy of any changes. To act in any
other manner, Argyris (1970) believes would have dire consequences for
the long range health and integrity of the client system regardless of
how much the specific changes might be needed. Argyris (1970) describes
freedom of choice in the following manner;
Free choice implies voluntary as opposed to automatic; proactive
rather than reactive. The act of selection is rarely accomplished
by maximizing or optimizing. Free and informed choice entails what
Simon has called "satisficing" that is, selecting the alternative
with the highest probability of succeeding given some specified
cost constraints. Free choice places the locus of decision-making
the client system. Free choice makes it possible for the clients
to remain responsible for their destiny. Through free choice, the
clients can maintain the autonomy of their systems. (1970, pp. 18-
In order for Argyris’ conceptualization of freedom of choice to
be viable, it rests on the underlying assumption that equality of oppor-
tunity to choose exists. Free choice, in order to work, must assume
that an open, free, and fair market place of ideas and values exist.
When these conditions are met, "authentic cultural pluralism" can exist.
These conditions are not presently being met in contemporary
American society. Conglomerates and monopolies are a way of life in
America, resulting in our pluralism being biased in terms of certain
military and industrial interests. The inevitable result is that our
social choices (options) are heavily influenced by certain organized
vested interest groups which perpetuate a pseudo-scarcity, survival ori-
ented culture.
The cards are stacked from the beginning (i.e., vested interests
of society) and the deal favors certain players (i.e., choice points)
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over others. The laboratory trainer by not challenging the rules of
the game but Playing the game as if it were a fair one invariably ends
up supporting a "fixed choice," a predetermined outcome: the prevail-
ing ideology and priorities of our society. For as Argyris tells us:
• • Free and informed choice entails c n M
that is selecting the
.alternative „Uh tL hfgh^st orobabiv^^f"8
"
succeeding, given some specified cost constraints. (1970, pp' 18-19)
How can the field of laboratory training make "authentic freedom
of choice" operational? How can laboratory training realistically con-
tribute toward making the option for people "to maximise their human po-
tential" a socially viable one? How can laboratory training contribute
toward making our institutions and communities humane given the realities
and priorities of the larger social system?
Part of the answer to these questions lies in summarizing the
reasons for laboratory training’s previous failures in not achieving
the above objectives up to now. First, the historical and philosophical
background out of which laboratory training has emerged tends to deny
and/or minimize the prevasiveness of the conflict existing between lab-
oratory training values (i.e.
,
cooperative culture) and the way society
is currently organized. Even when the conflict existing between labora-
tory training values and larger systems are acknowledged as some current
practitioners do e.g., Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968), it tends to be a
limited analysis of conflict. Thus, the changes that are advocated
(e.g., organizational effectiveness, community improvement) are not as
extensive and prevasive as the larger social realities would dictate.
Another tendency in laboratory training that works against social
change is to identify and limit an analysis of social problems to "process”
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issues
. Process issues are very important
s but when stressed to the
detriment of also looking at substantive value issues (e.g., organic
tional products and by-products)
,
it leads to a’ an incomplete and super-
ficial analysis. Thus the danger for the fieldi of laboratory training
is that by delimiting problems to process-method issues, it runs the
risk of perpetuating a blissful band of "myopic visionaries." In order
to avoid this pitfall laboratory training must develop a series of
guidelines as to the appropriate and inappropriate use of its methodol-
ogy in terms of product and by-product issues (substantive values) in
addition to its already strong concern for process values.
As previously discussed, the current laboratory conceptualiza-
tion of "freedom of choice" often neutralizes laboratory trainers* change
utility and weds them to established ideologies and priorities. In order
to make "authentic" freedom of choice a social reality laboratory train-
ers must be advocates for it rather than accept the current socially ad-
ministered and predetermined choices. Only by demanding a new deck of
cards and refusing to play with a deck that is already stacked and marked
against them does the field of laboratory training stand a chance for
realizing their social goals and concerns.
As Herbert Marcuse concludes in "One Dimensional Man" in refer-
ring to what is needed to change society,
. . . The fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the
fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period.
. . . Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore
not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which violates
the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game.
(1964
, pp. 256-257)
What is the mechanism (vehicle) through which laboratory training
could possibly achieve these goals? How could this potentially subversive
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alternative for change be actualized? Research in the field of social
movements offers us some guidelines. Blumer (1951) in his characteriza-
tion of general social movements seems to be describing the qualities
presently found in the human relations movement. He characterizes "gen-
eral social movements" as follows:
General social movements take the form of groping and uncoordinated
efforts. They have only a general direction, toward which they move
in a slow, halting, yet persistent fashion. As movements they are
unorganized, with neither established leadership nor recognized
membership, and little guidance or control. (p. 200)
Blumer goes on to say that general movements constitute the source out
of which more organized and efficient movements may grow. Hie general
social movement may give rise to a specific social movement which facil-
itates the process and focusses the direction of the advocated changes.
Killian, in describing characteristics of successful social move-
ments offers criteria that the field of human relations might adopt as
guidelines if it wishes to become a more effective force for social
change
:
1. The existence of shared values— a goal or an objective, sus-
tained by an ideology.
2. A sense of membership or participation— a "we-ness," a distinc-
tion between those who are for and those against.
3. Norms—shared understandings as to how the followers should act,
definitions of out-groups and how to behave toward them.
4. A structure— a division of labor between leaders and followers
and between different classes of each. (1964, p. 430)
Killian (1964) writes that the roots of all social movement for
change grow from a collective frustration with the social order. Cannot
the field of human relations be understood in such terms: Maliver (1971)
believes that the human relations movement is a response to the alienation
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and frustration that many Americans increasingly experience in their
daily lives. The lack of intimacy and close emotional ties prompts
people to seek group experiences in the hope that their collective lot
can be bettered.
If there can develop in the field of laboratory training a
shared consciousness of frustration with the social order coupled with
a belief m the possibility of a different state of affairs already
offered in the field, then a realizable alternative for change exists.
In order for laboratory training to become a realizable alternative,
however, it must first liberate itself from its dormant status and or-
ganize itself into an enduring and cohesive social movement.
EPILOGUE FOR LABORATORY TRAINING
"When playing the game you have to
follow the rules. And if the rules
are wrong you are beaten from the
beginning. And your victory will
then be your own defeat."
Jan Myrdal,
Confessions of a Disloyal European
(New York: Random House, 1968,
pp. 165-166)
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